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ABSTRACT 
Due to a rise of deregulated electric market and deterioration of aged power system 
infrastructure, it become more difficult to deal with the grid operating contingencies. 
Several major blackouts in the last two decades has brought utilities to focus on 
development of Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) systems. 
Availability of common measurement time reference as the fundamental requirement of 
WAMPAC system is attained by introducing the Phasor Measurement Units, or PMUs 
that are taking synchronized measurements using the GPS clock signal. The PMUs can 
calculate time-synchronized phasor values of voltage and currents, frequency and rate of 
change of frequency. Such measurements, alternatively called synchrophasors, can be 
utilized in several applications including disturbance and islanding detection, and control 
schemes. 
In this dissertation, an integrated synchrophasor-based scheme is proposed to 
detect, mitigate and prevent cascading outages and severe blackouts. This integrated 
scheme consists of several modules. First, a fault detector based on electromechanical 
wave oscillations at buses equipped with PMUs is proposed. Second, a system-wide 
vulnerability index analysis module based on voltage and current synchrophasor 
measurements is proposed. Third, an islanding prediction module which utilizes an offline 
islanding database and an online pattern recognition neural network is proposed. Finally, 
as the last resort to interrupt series of cascade outages, a controlled islanding module is 
developed which uses spectral clustering algorithm along with power system state variable 
and generator coherency information.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Problem Formulation 
Various disturbances occur in the power system due to reasons such as natural 
disasters, human errors, animal and vegetation contacts, malicious attacks and equipment 
malfunction, which may lead to the power network outages. In most cases, protective 
schemes along with proper control actions steer the system away from extreme outages. 
However, in certain situations a major disturbance may initiate successive outages over a 
large geographic area of the system known as “Cascading Outages” [1]. 
Many factors may contribute to cascading failures such as aging infrastructure, 
power system market conditions, inaccurate security analysis, inadequate relay setting and 
coordination, increased system complexity and lack of proper decision-making support 
tools and training for new operating conditions [2].  
Large-scale cascading outages may result in considerable economic loss to utilities 
and many other companies, as well as catastrophic impact on people’s life. Cascading 
failures often result in wide area blackouts which demand complicated troubleshooting 
and restoration process. It may take several hours up to few days to restore electric power 
in the affected areas due to the slow re-starting and re-synchronizing generators and loads, 
and re-energizing out of service transmission lines.  
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) introduced several 
standards on system planning and operation to assure the power systems’ reliability based 
on the key concepts defined as below [3], [4]: 
 Continuous active generation and load balance [5]; 
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 Maintain voltage profile by balancing reactive generation and demand [6]; 
 Monitor thermal limits of transmission lines [7];  
 Keep the system in stable condition [8]; 
 Design system to withstand the “N-1” contingency condition [9]; 
 Plan, design, and maintain the system to remain reliable [10]; 
 Prepare for emergencies [11]. 
Despite implementation of these key concepts, blackouts are yet inevitable which 
can be explicated by the following: 
  The transmission lines capacity did not upgraded at the same pace as the load 
demand; 
 In today’s restructured market, market participants regularly respond to load 
demand by transferring power over longer distances which requires further 
transmission investments [12]; 
 Consequently, the grid may operate closer to its margin, which have been the 
contributing factor in number of power system blackouts [13]. 
 Interconnection of neighboring grids may contribute to propagation of cascading 
outages following the blackout in one section [14]. 
Since, it is infeasible to eliminate all random failures, it is crucial to execute 
methods to reduce the likelihood of such failures evolving into major blackouts. Many 
researchers devoted their efforts to model and analyze cascading failures, as well as 
detection, mitigation or prevention of such events. Due to the wide range of involved 
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components along with different time scales of the event dynamics, study of cascading 
outages is extremely complicated and still remains an ongoing researching challenge. 
 Current Research Efforts 
Several methods aiming at understanding and finding ways for detecting, 
preventing, and mitigating the cascading events have been proposed so far [15]-[43]. An 
overview of existing major methods of cascading outages analysis is summarized as 
follows.  
1.2.1 Cascading Outage Modeling  
Considering complicated nature of the cascading outage, it is infeasible to model 
it with all possible combinations of failures since it would demand an enormous 
computational burden. Hence, several cascading outages modeling methods with 
simplification of different factors have been introduced in the literature.  
Three different methods based on the self-organized criticality theory have been 
proposed. The Oak Ridge-PSerc-Alaska (OPA) model [15]-[19] describes expansion of 
cascading outages over a large area of power system by analyzing slow and fast dynamics 
behavior of the system in a long-term view. The CASCADE model [20] explains the 
probability relations between the blackout size and the initial disturbance of power system 
and captures the weakening of the system as the cascade proceeds. The Branching Process 
(BP) model [21]-[23] simplifies the mathematical modeling of CASCADE models to 
estimate the probability distribution of the final blackout size. The three models neglect 
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many of the steps in the cascading process leading to blackouts, as well as the 
consideration of the timing of the events.  
The vulnerability of power system to cascading failures is studied in [24], [25] 
using a protection system reliability model. In these papers, the mechanism of protection 
schemes and system stability following a fault is studied to determine its contribution in 
cascading outages. Then, the stochastic properties of contingencies and protection system 
failures are studied using a Monte Carlo simulation. 
1.2.2 Cascade Outage Detection and Mitigation 
Several researchers studied different methods to protect power system against 
cascading outages. In [26]-[29], relay hidden failures are analyzed to decrease number of 
relay mis-operations which is the most influential factor impacting major blackouts.  
In [30], wide area backup protection and artificial intelligence techniques are used 
to minimize impact of a disturbance on the network. The Backup Protection Expert System 
(BPES) identifies the faulted component, and avoids unnecessary trip by blocking trip 
signals coming from other conventional backup protection relays.  
In [31], authors proposed a dynamic event tree method integrated with an event 
probability function to predict and mitigate cascading events. In [32], a pattern recognition 
method identifying typical patterns of cascading events has been introduced. However, 
these two methods require an excessive computational resources to consider different 
variations that may occur for a given cascading outage in a power system. 
The introduction and installation of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) in power 
systems has opened a new avenue to explore methods improving power systems operation. 
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Wide area monitoring, protection and control (WAMPAC) methods [33]-[38] incorporate 
GPS synchronization into protection, monitoring and control methods to make decisions 
at both substation and control center levels based on local and remote information send 
through communication channels. In [39], an intelligent scheme based on synchrophasor 
measurements to predict and mitigate wide area system transient instabilities is proposed. 
The scheme incorporates artificial neural networks (ANN) to predict the system 
instabilities, and applies a remedial action scheme (RAS) by splitting the system into 
islands and initiating under frequency load shedding actions. The challenge is to determine 
if an initially trained network is valid once the system is in a different operating state. In 
[40], two islanding detection methods, “Frequency Standard Deviation” and “Relative 
Phase Angle Change Rate” based on PMU measurement are proposed and tested using 
historical synchrophasor data. The proposed method is simple and effective, but it fails to 
identify the exact boundaries of the islands. 
A real-time event detection and feature extraction using PMU measurement data 
is proposed in [41]. The authors did not compare their algorithm with other event detection 
techniques, and failed to confirm whether it is applicable to large-scale interconnections, 
or not. A decentralized/hierarchical stabilizing control approach utilizing PMU 
measurements to improve dynamic performance of the Hydro-Quebec’s power system is 
proposed in [42]. The approach has not consider communication time lag and remote 
control signal loss as two important factors. In [43], a fast PMU based approach is 
deployed to monitor the stress with regard to bulk power transfer across different areas in 
real time when multiple outages occur inside an area. The method utilizes constant weights 
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that are calculated from the base case DC load flow, which decrease the overall accuracy 
of it. 
 Proposed Research 
The introduction of PMUs into power system in the early eighties has exhibited 
great superiority in enhancing system situational awareness [37]-[39]. PMUs made it 
possible to measure voltages and currents phasor at different locations in the power grid 
all having the angle difference calculated related to a given location with a reference angle. 
As these measurements are synchronized using Global Positioning System (GPS), they 
can be used to assess and correlate system conditions in real-time. 
In this dissertation, several new tools based on availability of synchrophasor 
measurements have been developed to detect, prevent and mitigate the cascading outages. 
The main objectives of this dissertation are: a) investigation of cascading outages’ 
mechanisms to effectively design proposed techniques, b) development, implementation 
and testing of the tools to detect, prevent and mitigate cascading outages. The 
methodology of this research is as follows: 
 Investigate the mechanism of cascading outages; 
 Develop a synchrophasor based fault identification tool based on propagation of 
electromechanical wave oscillations, along with a vulnerability analysis tool for 
the early detection of cascading outages based on the steady state progress 
character of cascading outages; 
 Develop an islanding prediction tool to prevent progression of cascading outages 
from steady state to fast transient state; 
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 Develop an intentional islanding tool to mitigate cascading outages at the fast 
transient state and prevent it from unfolding to a major blackout; 
 Implement, integrate and evaluate the performance of the proposed control 
schemes. 
 The proposed approach has some major advantages over the previously proposed 
techniques, such as: 
 Identifying vulnerable areas and reducing maintenance time by notifying operator 
about the type and location of disturbance; 
 Detecting areas which are prone to uncontrolled islanding and preventing 
occurrence of such islands; 
 Introducing an automated controlled islanding strategy which minimize the 
cascade outage damage due to fast and optimized decision making process. 
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2. UNDERSTANDING OF CASCADING OUTAGES MECHANISM 
 Overview 
Table 1 lists several major blackouts in the past decades which affected millions 
of people [3], [44]-[47]. A simple observation verifies that the number of major blackouts 
has increased in the recent years which draws special attention to the cascading outages. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF SEVERAL MAJOR BLACKOUTS 
no Location Date 
MW 
Loss 
Affected People 
(106) 
Collapse 
Time 
Restoration 
Time (Hr) 
1 US-Northeastern 11/09/1965 20000 30 13 mins 13 
2 New York 7/13/1977 6000 9 1 hr 26 
3 Thailand 03/18/1978 - 40 - 9 
4 France 12/19/1978 29000 - 26 mins 5 
5 Sweden 12/27/1983 > 7000 4,5 53 secs 5 
6 Tokyo (Japan) 07/23/1987 8200 2.8 20 mins 1.25 
7 US-Western 07/02/1996 11850 2 36 secs - 
8 US-Western 08/10/1996 30500 7.5 >6 mins 9 
9 Brazil 03/11/1999 25000 75 30 secs 4 
10 India 01/02/2001 12000 220  13 
11 US- Northeastern 08/14/2003 61800 50 > 1hr Up to 4 days 
12 Denmark/Sweden 09/23/2003 6550 4.85 7 mins 2 to 4.3 
13 Italy 09/28/2003 27700 57 27 mins 2.5 to 19.5 
14 Moscow/Russia 05/24/2005 2500 4 > 6 hr - 
15 US-EI 08/04/2007 4261 - 6 mins - 
16 Brazil 11/10/2009 18000 60  >3 
17 US-San Diego 09/08/2011 6982 2.7 11 mins 1.5 to 12 
18 South Korea 09/15/2011 240 2.1 2 hr > 3 
19 Chile 09/25/2011 - 9 - > 2 
20 India 07/30/2012 >36000 300 2.5 hr 13.5 
21 India 07/31/2012 >48000 670 5 min 2 to 8 
22 Bangladesh 11/01/2014 445 150 - 10 
23 Pakistan 01/26/2015 >8400 140 - <1 day 
24 Turkey 03/31/2015 - 70 - 10 
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 Frequency of Large Blackouts  
It has been a common concern to estimate the frequency of large-scale blackouts 
in comparison with the small ones. Researchers suggested that the probability distribution 
of blackouts with a similar size as the 2003 North American one can be approximately 
modeled by a power law region with an exponent between -1 and -2 [48]-[52]. Figure 2.1 
illustrates the example of the empirical probability distribution of the North American 
blackout size obtained on a logarithmic scale [53]. Figure 2.2 is another numerical proof of 
the power law properties which has been obtained by analysis of historical blackouts in North 
America [53]. In this figure, the frequencies of blackouts in various size categorize in terms 
of the total amount of demand interrupted is calculated, which obeys the mentioned power 
law region (see Figure 2.2). The identical power law properties have been obtained from 
analysis of historical blackouts in China [54], Sweden [55], Norway [56], etc.  
The power law property indicates that the possibility of large-scale blackouts is 
much greater than it was expected earlier. This situation can be described considering 
dependency of outages during a blackout. As the number of outages increases in a given 
cascading outage scenario, the power system becomes more stressed. The weakened 
power system elevates the possibility of succeeding outages, which will evolves to the 
large-scale blackout. 
  
10 
 
 
Figure 2.1 North American blackout size probability distribution from NERC 
disturbance analysis working group data [53] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 The relative blackout frequency to blackout risk from large North 
America blackouts in various size categories [2] 
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 Analysis of August 14th 2003 Blackout 
On August 14, 2003, large area of the Northeast United States and Province of 
Ontario, Canada, experienced a major blackout (case 11 of Table 1). The aftermath reports 
estimated that nearly 50 million people were affected due to the 61.8 GW electric load 
loss caused by the blackout. Figure 2.3 shows generation, demand, and interregional 
power flows before the blackout [3]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Generation, demand, and interregional power flows on August 14, 
2003, at 15:05 EDT [3] 
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2.3.1 Timeline of Events  
Analysis revealed that similar to many other blackouts, this one could also be 
divided into two main stages. In the first stage, the system went from a normal operating 
state into a period of abnormal but yet likely manageable state. Then, at the second stage, 
an uncontrollable sequence of events in the northern Ohio spread the outages into other 
areas and led to the major blackout. Figure 2.4 shows the sequence of events [3]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Timeline of 2003 Northeastern blackout [3] 
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The MISO’s state estimator failed to update its status following the losses of the 
Eastlake 5 unit and Stuart-Atlanta 345-kV transmission line. As a result, MISO failed to 
perform contingency analysis, and realize that several transmission lines were heavily 
loaded. The state estimator and contingency analysis failure started 12:15 EDT and failed 
to get restored till 16:04 EDT, about two minutes before the start of the second stage of 
the cascade outages [57].  
From 15:05 EDT to 15:42 EDT, three FirstEnergy (FE) 345-kV transmission lines 
in the Cleveland area went out of service due to heavily loaded conductors which sagged 
into overgrown trees. This caused outages that further increased the overloading problem 
on the remaining lines and decreased voltage level of the system which resulted in the 
collapse of 138-kV transmission system in Northern Ohio in less than half an hour [57].  
Tripping of the Sammis-Star 345-kV transmission line due to a zone-3 impedance 
relay operation became a turning point which initiated the fast transient stability loss stage 
of cascading outages, which resulted in the blackout across the northeast United States 
and Ontario. In a time span of 5 minutes, thirteen 345-kV or 138-kV transmission lines in 
Ohio and Michigan states tripped due to zone 2 or 3 operation of distance relays. The 
excessive voltage drop caused the intrusion of impedance characteristic into zone 2 or 3 
and it appear to the protective relays as a remote fault on the system. As oscillations 
continued getting stronger; the voltages were also declining faster, and the system was 
losing power plants one after each other. Many events occurred on the grid between 
16:10:36 EDT and 16:13 EDT due to automatic equipment operations, which formed 
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several islands in northeast U.S. and Canada, including Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey and Ontario [57]. 
2.3.2 Observations  
The first post event observation revealed that during blackout the grid was split 
into two sections, one that experienced a blackout, and the other one that recovered 
without further propagation of the cascade outages. In the Midwest area, the amount of 
reserved reactive power was relatively small which left the system little margin to deal 
with low voltage conditions. In contrast, in the Northeast area, availability of more reactive 
reserves helped the operators to buffer their areas against potential voltage collapse 
without widespread generation trips.  
The second observation revealed that the proper load shedding by Under 
Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) and Under Voltage Load Shedding (UVLS) relays 
before the loss of the Sammis-Star line might have prevented further cascade outages and 
massive blackout. However, in the second cascade stage when the fast dynamic transients 
were spreading throughout the system, even the proper action of UFLS and UVLS relays 
would have not prevent the successive outages.  
The third observation revealed the reason behind the tripping of large number of 
generators. According to [3], more than 508 individual generating units in 265 power 
plants shut down in this blackout. In the first stage, protective relays responded to 
overloaded transmission lines and tripped 29 (6%) generators. Due to the system 
configuration change during formation of islands, loss of synchronism and excitation 
system failures, another fifty generators (10%) tripped. After the formation of islands, 431 
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generators (84%) tripped mainly concurrent with under-frequency load-shedding relay 
operation. Several generators tripped in response to over-speed or over-voltage protection 
relays trip command initiated due to the major loss of their loads. On the other hand, in 
several islands, generators faced a sudden huge increase of loads and tripped by UFLS 
and UVLS protection relays.  
The fourth observation is the successive tripping of three 345-kV transmission 
lines which were below their emergency rating and could have withstand the situation. 
Due to overgrown trees in their path and lack of proper tree trimming, the conductors 
sagged into the vegetation following the continuous overload condition. Degradation of 
the system following these outages resulted in voltage drops across vulnerable areas and 
triggered the mis-operation of zone 2 and zone 3 of impedance relays. 
The last observation suggests that the Quebec system in Canada survived the 
blackout due to being tied to Eastern Interconnection through high voltage DC (HVDC) 
transmission lines. Therefore, the practice of using DC links to tie areas to each other can 
act as a shield against frequency swings under such circumstances. 
 Other Cascading Outages without Successful Mitigation 
In 2012, a massive blackout occurred in India [58] which affected nearly 700 
million customers (case 21 of Table 1). Tripping of the tie lines due to load encroachment 
following largely unscheduled power interchanges, power swing and UFLS/UVLS 
protective relays tripping commands were among the main reasons which eventually led 
to the blackout. 
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In September 2011, the loss of a single 500 kV transmission line which was a 
major transmission corridor from generators in Arizona to the San Diego area, initiated an 
11-minute cascading outages leading to a blackout. Nearly 2.7 million customers were 
affected in parts of Arizona, Southern California, and Baja California, Mexico for up to 
12 hours [59]. After loss of the 500kV line, power flows significantly increased through 
lower voltage systems. As a consequence, some sizeable voltage deviations and equipment 
overloads occurred throughout the system, as well as significant overloading occurred on 
three 230/92 kV transformers. The flow redistributions, voltage deviations, and resulting 
overloads had a ripple effect, as transformers, transmission lines, and generating units 
were tripped by relays, which initiated the automatic load shedding throughout the region 
in a relatively short time span. Just seconds before the blackout, Path 44 of WECC carried 
all flows into the San Diego area as well as parts of Arizona and Mexico. Eventually, the 
excessive loading on Path 44 initiated a RAS scheme at San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station (SONG) which led to the loss of the SONGS nuclear units, and eventually resulted 
in the complete blackout [60]. 
 Successfully Mitigated Cascading Outage Cases   
In 2008, on the UK network, two large size generators tripped within 2 minutes 
resulted in further tripping of embedded generation in the distribution system, which 
caused frequency to drop to 48.795 Hz [61]. This frequency drop was stopped by shedding 
of 1.5% of demand load to restore system frequency and later the dropped loads restored 
within a range of 20-40 minutes. In this case, successful coordination between the 
Transmission System Operator (TSO) and the Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) in 
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the load shedding process prevented the progress of cascading outages and system 
collapse. 
In 2006, a planned outage by E.ON Netz1 (TSO Company) which were failed to 
be properly evaluated for the N-1 security caused a major disturbance in Europe [62]. 
Tripping of a tie-line (connecting two TSOs) with different protection settings on each end 
has initiated cascades throughout the UCTE2 system. Next, the trip commands of over-
current distance protection and out of synchronism relays caused the UCTE system to split 
into three areas. Within 20 minutes, two of these areas were restored from an under-
frequency situation owing to the sufficient generation reserve and proper load shedding. 
However, lack of coordination between TSOs and DNOs resulted in longer restoration 
time in the over-frequency area. 
 Mechanism of Cascading Outages 
The sequence of cascading failures varies widely from event to event, and whether 
they have similarities among them is an important topic to explore. So far, by reviewing 
the major blackouts in the world, the background of cascading outages have been 
introduced. Figure 2.5 shows the structure of a generalized sequence of cascading events 
and associated power system operations [63]. Before the system falls under extreme 
condition, operator might yet have enough time to initiate remedial actions to mitigate the 
progression of cascading events. A real time automated cascade event mitigation tools 
                                                 
1 The company was founded in 1927 and is based in Bayreuth, Germany. 
2 Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity. 
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may significantly decrease the risk of progression of such events into a large-scale 
blackout since they will help operators to deal with the cascade mitigation timely. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2.5 Different stages of cascading outages 
 
 
 
Most of cascading outages have following stages of progression: 
 The initial triggering event may occur anytime in power system due to reasons 
such as tripping a line or generator following a fault or maintenance order. 
 Another independent failure or unexpected change in operating conditions 
following the previous control action may coincidently or sequentially occur while 
system is in normal insecure state. At this point, depending on the system loading 
condition, power system may enter to the state of slow progression of cascading 
outages. In a time span of few minutes to several hours, some lines might be taken 
out due to tripping commands from overcurrent, distance and thermal protection 
units. 
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 Without proper remedial actions, power system will enter to an unstable state with 
major load/generation imbalance, voltage and frequency instability, followed by 
an uncontrolled islanding and finally a blackout.    
The time interval between an initial triggering event in the normal state and series 
of outages in cascade state may varies significantly. For instance, the time interval 
between a fault and a trip caused by relay mis-operation can be less than a second. 
However, an overload and/or generator over-excitation situation caused by tripped line 
due to a fault may cause subsequent outages which may occur minutes or even hours later.  
Large-scale blackouts start for different reasons, but once they evolve into the 
cascading events, they reveal similar mechanisms. The following mechanisms were 
detected among most of historical cascading outages [64]:  
 Over-current and distance relays disconnect highly overloaded lines 
 Thermal failures of highly overloaded lines 
 Relay mis-operation due to hidden failures 
 Voltage and frequency instability 
 Small-disturbance and transient angular instability 
 Lack of coordination between operators, planners and protection engineers in 
terms of protection settings, real time exchanges, system studies and planning in 
key areas 
 Conclusion 
Studies have revealed the devastating impacts of cascading outages on economic 
and social life. In this section, fundamentals of cascading outages have been introduced 
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by exploring several major blackouts in recent decades. By investigation of the 
mechanisms of cascading outages, it has been determined that if a real time automated 
tool is developed to arrest cascade outage at its early progression stages, it can avoid 
further propagation of outages. In the next section, the fundamental of an integrated real 
time synchrophasor based solution to achieve this goal will be discussed. 
 Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the mechanism of 
cascading outages by reviewing several historical outages. The fundamentals of the 
proposed approach are provided in Section 3. The proposed synchrophasor based 
monitoring tools are presented in Section 4. An islanding prediction tool to predict areas 
of system which are prone to unwanted islanding formation is proposed in section 5. In 
section 6, a controlled islanding tool is proposed to split system into islands and prevent 
propagation of cascading outages. The initial test results follow in section 7. The expected 
contribution and conclusions of the dissertation are discussed in section 8. References, as 
well as published papers related to this work are listed in the end. 
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3. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PROPOSED SYNCHROPHASOR BASED 
APPROACH 
 Overview 
In this dissertation, a set of tools to support power system operator’s decision-
making process is proposed which includes online monitoring tools, islanding prediction 
tool, and intentional islanding tool. Based on these proposed tools, this dissertation 
provides an interactive scheme solution for the fast detection and mitigation of cascading 
outages in power system.  
 Application of Synchrophasor System in Power system  
Nowadays, PMUs are the latest technology advancement in the measuring 
instruments in the power system which offer synchronized voltage/current phasor 
measurements across different locations of the system. Based on a comprehensive 
literature survey, a broad range of PMU-based applications in power systems has been 
identified. A list of synchrophasor based applications in power system is shown in Table 
2 [65].  
In recent years, synchrophasor systems have been widely used by utilities around 
the world to monitor and analyze power system behavior. With the availability of fast 
processing CPUs and a reliable high-speed communication infrastructure to transfer all 
measurements, synchrophasors are now being deployed to address a variety of power 
system protection, automation, and control problems, as well.  
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  TABLE 2 LIST OF SYNCHROPHASOR BASED APPLICATIONS IN POWER SYSTEM 
Offline Applications Online Applications 
Post-Event Analysis Enhanced State-estimation 
System Parameterization Oscillation Monitoring & Control 
Dynamic Model Validation Voltage Security Assessment & Control 
System Protection & Control Planning System Protection & Real-time Control 
 Fault Location & Detection 
 Intelligent Islanding & Resynchronization 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the placement of PMUs in the North American power grid by 
March 2015. The blue points are PMUs’ locations and red lines show the path of data 
transfer from local PMUs to regional data concentrator locations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 PMUs distribution and synchrophasor data flows in the North 
American power grid, March 2015 [66]. 
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 Application of Synchrophasor System in Blackout Prevention 
3.3.1 Monitoring and Prediction Tools 
 Local protective devices operate mainly based on local measurements, and may 
fail to observe the effect of their decision-making process on the entire system. For 
instance, operation of a local protection unit to secure an asset in case of a thermal overload 
condition, may trigger a series of cascade failures due to thermal overloads of other assets.  
With the availability of synchrophasor systems, time-stamped measurements could 
be collected from remote locations to form real time snapshots of power systems with a 
resolution up to 30, 60, 120 or 240 frames per second. Thus, it can provide a unique 
opportunity to monitor the power system at a wide area level. These measurements could 
be further used to develop monitoring applications to improve security and dependency of 
the power system protection. Figure 3.2 shows a typical architecture of synchrophasor 
system which is used to implement different power system applications. 
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Figure 3.2 Overall architecture of synchrophasor system applications 
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In the example of overloaded asset, a wide area synchrophasor based monitoring 
scheme could halt the local protection action by monitoring the evolving threat to the 
system security. Thus, it can provide additional time for control center operator to mitigate 
the overload condition and maintain system security. 
It should also be noted that the complexity of wide area disturbances and the short 
restoration time requires an automatic decision-making mechanism to speed up the 
process rather than human-based one, which may be too slow. These automatic monitoring 
tools can be developed using synchrophasor measurements to avoid human errors which 
may drag the system into insecure state and a possible blackout. 
In this dissertation, three synchrophasor based tools are developed to monitor the 
power system in real time and predict possibility of unwanted islanding formation. These 
tools work together to provide a full resolution of the system condition in normal and slow 
progression cascade stages. The first tool monitors the power system by computing 
vulnerability indices defined based on synchrophasor measurements. These 
synchrophasor based indices can provide a precise quantitative measure of system 
vulnerability and security condition by continuously monitoring of the system. These 
indices can be calculated for different regions to identify vulnerable parts of the system (if 
any), and notify operators to take the suitable control action to prevent further outages. 
The second monitoring tool uses synchrophasor measurements to identify location of a 
fault within the grid. The methodology used to develop the fault identification tool is based 
on detection of electromechanical waves which propagate in the network following a fault. 
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The third tool uses the output of vulnerability analysis tool along with an islanding 
database which is created in offline analysis to predict areas prone to formation of 
unwanted islands. This tool can inform the operator regarding the chance of un-wanted 
island formation as well as a list of possible outages that may lead to a system unwanted 
separation. 
3.3.2 Mitigation Tool  
The typical control actions to prevent cascading outages are shown in Figure 3.3 
[67]. Certain mechanisms such as optimizing active and reactive power generation, 
tripping generators and transmission lines or load shedding trigged by under voltage or 
under frequency load shedding relays (UVLS/UFLS) are used to prevent or mitigate 
contingencies. However, these techniques may fail to mitigate cascading outages due to 
the complex nature of the cascading outages as described in section 2. 
 
 
 
 Optimizing Reactive Generation Sources
 Optimizing Active Generation Sources
 Under Voltage Load Shedding (UVLS)
 Under Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS)
 Generator Tripping
 Proper Zone-3 Coordination
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Figure 3.3 Typical control actions to prevent cascading outages [67] 
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Today’s modern power systems operate closer to their stability margins, and are 
more subjected to large disturbances which make the conventional mitigation mechanisms 
less effective. In case of a large disturbance created by a series of cascading outages, 
operation of local distance or overcurrent relays, as well as load shedding triggered by 
UFLS and UVLS relays system may not be sufficient, and the system can eventually split 
into several islands. In this condition, a controlled islanding scheme could be used as a 
final solution to prevent the propagation of cascading outage and minimize load and 
generation losses.  
In this dissertation a controlled islanding method to prevent system from further 
outages and losses is proposed. If the monitoring and prediction tools fail to prevent 
progression of cascading outages, the proposed controlled islanding tool will be triggered 
using information obtained through synchrophasor measurements. Then, the controlled 
islanding tool intentionally separates the power system into several load-generation 
balanced islands to prevent the propagation of cascading outages with an optimal 
minimum loss of load and generation. Once a disturbance occurs, depending on the 
topology and nature of the system, generators will swing together in different groups. 
These groups of generators swinging together can be determined using the slow coherency 
characteristics of the system [68]. The proposed controlled islanding tool determines the 
cutsets with minimum loss of load and generation while keeping the coherent generators 
within same islands. This way, the generators within each intentionally created island will 
swing together, while the islands’ boundaries are optimized to have load-generation 
balance.   
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 Interaction of the Proposed Tools   
Figure 3.4 shows the integrated framework of the proposed tools, which covers 
different stages of cascading outages described in Figure 2.5. The key algorithms of the 
proposed solution are as follows: 
 In the normal stage (secure or insecure), the two proposed methods, namely, 
Synchrophasor based Online Vulnerability Index (SOVI) and Synchrophasor 
based Online Fault Identification (SOFI) modules operate together to monitor the 
state of power systems. If the sequence of events is such that the system is drifting 
towards the stage of slow progression cascading outage, an alarm is sent to the 
operator and the other proposed mechanisms to prevent progression of cascading 
outages. The SOFI module determines the type and location of disturbances, and 
consequently, the network parameters are updated. 
  In the stage of slowly progressing cascading outages, a Synchrophasor based 
Islanding Predication (SIP) module is proposed to determine parts of the system 
which have tendency to be separated from the rest of it. The SIP module runs in 
real-time, and if an area prone to form of an unwanted island is detected, an alarm 
is sent to the operator to apply proper RAS actions. The SIP module consists of 
two parts, an offline islanding scenario database, and an online intelligent method 
which uses the output of SOFI module to determine whether a specific area is 
prone to form an island. 
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Figure 3.4 Flowchart of the proposed method for detection, prevention and 
mitigation of cascading outages 
 
 
 
 If the RAS module fails to restore the system into the normal stage, and cascading 
outages continue to unfold, the system enters to the stage of fast transient cascading 
outage. In this stage, an Integrated Controlled Islanding (ICI) module is proposed 
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to rescue the system from a total blackout. The ICI module utilizes the graph 
representation of the power system, power flow analysis, location of PMUs and 
generator coherency information to solve a constrained optimization problem. The 
ICI module runs in real-time to determine the switching sequences required to 
create intentional islands.  
 Conclusion 
The power system cascading outages are complex because many factors can cause 
cascading outages. Synchrophasor systems can provide a unique opportunity to detect, 
prevent and mitigate cascading outages. In this section, an overview of the proposed 
synchrophasor based tools to be deployed at different system condition to detect, prevent, 
and mitigate cascading outages is presented. These tools will be thoroughly discussed and 
tested in the remaining sections.   
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4. SYNCHROPHASOR BASED ONLINE MONITORING TOOLS* 
 Introduction 
In the normal condition, power systems are designed to withstand “N-1” 
contingency. In many cases, a system is able to withstand more than one contingency, 
while its stability margins shrinks. Under these circumstances, it is pivotal to design a 
monitoring tool to continually monitor the power system, and notify the operator when 
areas of the system becomes vulnerable. In this section, two synchrophasor based tools 
are introduced to monitor the power system in the normal stage. These methods utilize the 
base power flow and network topology data along with available PMU measurements to 
determine the vulnerability of different areas of the power system, as well as disturbance 
locations. Section 4.2 reviews the applications of graph theory in the proposed power 
system monitoring tools. The Synchrophasor based Vulnerability Index (SOVI) and 
Synchrophasor based Online Fault Identification (SOFI) modules are presented in 
Sections 4.3 & 4.4, respectively. Summary is given in Section 4.5.  
 Graph Representation of Power Systems 
Graph theory is one of the fast-growing areas of modern mathematics which has 
been extensively utilized in many areas, such as mathematics, computer programming and 
networking, economics and communications [69]-[76].  Graph theory is a practical mean 
to simplify the complicated problems into a set of edges and vertices. Electric power 
                                                 
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “Fault Location Using Sparse Synchrophasor 
Measurement of Electromechanical-Wave Oscillations” by A. Esmaeilian and M. Kezunovic, Aug. 2016. 
IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 1787-1796, ©2016 IEEE, with permission from 
IEEE. 
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system composed of thousands of generators, transformers, transmission lines, and loads, 
can be modeled and analyzed as a graph network. 
In [77], Lee, et al. proposed an economic dispatch model based on graph theory. 
In [78], graph theory is used to describe the grid as a function of its electrical topology 
rather than physical one. In [79], authors applied graphs theory to demonstrate that the 
heterogeneous nature of the power system makes it vulnerable to malicious attacks which 
may trigger a large-scale cascade outages.  
A state estimation observability analysis based on hybrid topological-numerical 
approach is proposed in [80]. The authors used a graph partitioning method to split system 
into observable and unobservable areas. A multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) 
method based on the definition of the attack graph is presented in [81]. Authors used the 
MCDM method to address issues related to the security analysis of power control process. 
A model-based fault identification and location scheme based on graph structural analysis 
is presented in [82]. The proposed method provides an automatic residual generation 
strategy using the analytical redundancy inherent in the system structure.  
In this section, graph theory is used to identify the vulnerable parts of the power 
system. 
4.2.1 Graph Model of Power System Elements 
4.2.1.1 Undirected Graph 
Suppose G=(V, E) is a graph network with v nodes (vertices) and e links (edges) 
where V and  E are the sets of vertices, and connecting edges between those vertices, 
respectively. An important matrix, widely used to study graphs is known as adjacency 
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matrix which is a measure of connectivity of graphs’ vertices. The adjacency matrix A is 
a symmetric matrix with all its diagonal elements equal to 1, which indicates each vertex 
is connected to itself. The element aij of adjacency matrix A is equal to 1 if there is an edge 
between vi and vj, otherwise is equal to zero. 
 
𝐴𝑣×𝑣 = {𝑎𝑖𝑗}  𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑣𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑗
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
       (4.1) 
 
For instance, for a graph with five vertices and seven edges shown in Figure 4.1, 
the incidence matrix A can be obtained based on (4.1): 
 
𝐴 =
[
 
 
 
 
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1]
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24
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
e7
 
Figure 4.1 A graph with five vertices and seven edges 
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In this dissertation, to represent the topological model of power system as a graph, 
substations (composed of generators, bus bars and loads) and transmission lines are 
modeled as the nodes and links of the graph, respectively. Thus the undirected graph 
model of the power system is easily obtained. 
4.2.1.2 Directed Graph  
In power engineering, the power flow study is always an important tool involving 
numerical analysis applied to a power system. It has been demonstrated that in steady state 
condition, a power system could be modeled as a directed graph network [63], since the 
directions of power flow in the modeled network can be measured in any given steady state 
condition.  
For the directed graph, the definition of incidence matrix is different than the one in 
undirected graph. For a directed graph G, the incidence matrix A implies the connectivity of 
the vertices with regard to edges’ directions. Similarly, all diagonal elements of the 
adjacency matrix A are equal to 1, which indicates each vertex is connected to itself.  The 
element aij of incidence matrix A is equal to 1 if there is a directed edge from vi to vj, 
otherwise is equal to zero. 
 
𝐴𝑣×𝑣 = {𝑎𝑖𝑗}       𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑣𝑖  𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑗
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
     (4.2) 
 
For instance, for a directed graph with five vertices and seven edges shown in 
Figure 4.2, the incidence matrix A can be obtained based on (4.2): 
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𝐴 =
[
 
 
 
 
1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1]
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Figure 4.2 A graph with five vertices and seven edges 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Betweenness Centrality Concept  
The betweenness centrality was first introduced by Freeman [83] as part of his 
study to obtain influential level of a person or group in a social network. In graph 
theory, betweenness centrality index can be defined for each vertex and edge based 
on definition of shortest paths. Betweenness centrality has a wide application in network 
theory. For instance, in a telecommunications network, a node with higher betweenness 
centrality would have more control over the network, because more information will pass 
through that node. 
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For the given graph G=(V, E), the vertex betweenness centrality BC(v) of a vertex 
v  V is the sum over all pairs of vertices u,wV, of the fraction of shortest paths between 
u and w that pass through vertex v, which is shown as: 
 
𝐵𝐶(𝑣) = ∑
𝜎𝑢𝑤(𝑣)
𝜎𝑢𝑤𝑢,𝑤𝑉
𝑢≠𝑤≠𝑣
 
 (4.3) 
 
where 𝜎𝑢𝑤(𝑣) denotes the total number of shortest path between vertex u and w that pass 
through v, and 𝜎𝑢𝑤 denotes the total number of shortest paths between u and w. 
Similar to the vertex betweenness centrality, the edge betweenness centrality 
BC(e) of a edge e  E is defined as the sum over all pairs of vertices u,wV, of the fraction 
of shortest paths between u and w that pass through edge e, which is shown as: 
 
𝐵𝐶(𝑒) = ∑
𝜎𝑢𝑤(𝑒)
𝜎𝑢𝑤𝑢,𝑤𝑉
𝑢≠𝑤
 
(4.4) 
 
where 𝜎𝑢𝑤(𝑒) denotes the total number of shortest path between vertex u and w that pass 
through e, and 𝜎𝑢𝑤 denotes the total number of shortest paths between u and w. 
For instance, consider a graph with six vertices and seven edges shown in Figure 4.3. 
The vertex betweenness centrality of node b is calculated as: 
 
𝐵𝐶(𝑏) = ∑
𝜎𝑢𝑤(𝑏)
𝜎𝑢𝑤𝑢,𝑤𝑉
𝑢≠𝑤≠𝑣
= 𝜎𝑎𝑐(𝑏) 𝜎𝑎𝑐⁄ + 𝜎𝑎𝑑(𝑏) 𝜎𝑎𝑑 + 𝜎𝑎𝑒(𝑏) 𝜎𝑎𝑒⁄ + 𝜎𝑎𝑓(𝑏) 𝜎𝑎𝑓⁄⁄
= 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 4 
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Similarly, the edge betweenness centrality of edge ab is calculated as: 
 
𝐵𝐶(𝑎𝑏) = ∑
𝜎𝑢𝑤(𝑎𝑏)
𝜎𝑢𝑤𝑢,𝑤𝑉
𝑢≠𝑤
 
= 𝜎𝑎𝑏(𝑎𝑏) 𝜎𝑎𝑏⁄ + 𝜎𝑎𝑐(𝑎𝑏) 𝜎𝑎𝑐 + 𝜎𝑎𝑑(𝑎𝑏) 𝜎𝑎𝑑⁄ + 𝜎𝑎𝑒(𝑎𝑏) 𝜎𝑎𝑒 + 𝜎𝑎𝑓(𝑎𝑏) 𝜎𝑎𝑓⁄⁄⁄  
       =1+1+1+1=4 
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Figure 4.3 A directed graph with six vertices and seven edges 
 
 
 
 Synchrophasor Based Vulnerability Analysis Module 
Song has proposed the concepts of Vulnerability Index (VI) and Margin Index 
(MI) [1] for the main elements in power system including generators, buses, and branches. 
The system-wide vulnerability and security of individual elements can be evaluated by the 
different VI and MI values computed for various system conditions. Pang improved the 
concept of VI and MI by inducing a method to calculate the weight values for each VI and 
MI [2] using the concept of vertex and edge betweenness centralities. His approach 
provided a combined consideration of both electrical characteristics of power system and 
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topology parameters in the graph representation of the electrical network. But, those VIs 
and MIs are only considered in the steady state condition when the power flow result is 
available through state estimation, and therefore may not be useful for cascade outage 
detection.  
The vulnerability monitoring method, if developed as an online module, can 
swiftly and effectively determine which parts of the system are prone to cascading outage. 
This way, the cascading outages could be avoided ahead of the time by applying proper 
remedial actions to restore the stability margin of the system. 
4.3.1 Formulation 
In this dissertation, PMU measurements are used to obtain VIs of the power system 
in real-time at system-wide level. As shown in Figure 4.4, the proposed SOVI module 
operates within the following steps: 
 The synchrophasor streams measured by PMUs (or other PMU enabled devices 
such as digital protective relays (DPRs) or digital fault recorders (DFRs)) at 
different substations are collected by substation Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) 
and transferred through communication links to the control center PDC and stored 
at synchrophasor PI historian database.  
 The SOVI module utilizes voltage and current phasors measured captured at PMUs 
location in real-time to define three different types of VIs associated with buses, 
lines and generators, respectively.  
 VIs associated with buses reflect changes in buses voltage or load from scheduled 
values and is defined as:  
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Figure 4.4 Overall structure of the SOVI tool 
 
 
 
𝑆𝑉𝐼𝐵𝑢𝑠,𝑖 =
𝑊𝑉,𝑖
2
[(
𝑉𝑖 − ∆𝑉𝑖
𝑠𝑐ℎ
∆𝑉𝑖
𝑙𝑖𝑚
)
2
+ 𝑟𝑖 ] (4.5) 
𝑊𝑉,𝑖: Weight of individual bus voltage influence 
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𝑉𝑖: Individual bus voltage magnitude 
∆𝑉𝑖
𝑠𝑐ℎ: Individual bus scheduled voltage magnitude 
∆𝑉𝑖
𝑙𝑖𝑚: Individual bus voltage variance limit 
𝑟𝑖: load loss ratio, 0~1, 0: no loss; 1: completely loss 
 
 VIs associated with lines reflect changes in active or reactive power flows through 
lines, as well as status of the lines (in-service or out-of-service). 
 
𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒,𝑗 =
𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒,𝑗
2
[(
𝑃𝑓,𝑗
𝑆𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥)
2
+ (
𝑄𝑓,𝑗
𝑆𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥)
2
+ 𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒−𝑗 ] (4.6) 
 
𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒,𝑗: Weight of individual line influence 
𝑃𝑓,𝑗: Individual line real power 
𝑄𝑓,𝑗: Individual line reactive power 
𝑆𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥: Individual line transmission limit, which can be either thermal limit or 
transfer limit due to security constraints 
𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒−𝑗: 1 when line is out-of-service, 0 when line is in-service 
 
 VIs associated with generators reflect changes in active or reactive power 
generation. 
 
𝑆𝑉𝐼𝐺𝑒𝑛,𝑙 =
𝑊𝑃𝑔,𝑙
2
[(
𝑃𝑔,𝑙
𝑃𝑔,𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥)
2
+ (
𝑄𝑔,𝑙
𝑄𝑔,𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥)
2
+ 𝑘𝑔𝑒𝑛−𝑙] (4.7) 
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𝑊𝑃𝑔,𝑙: Weight of individual generator  
𝑃𝑔,𝑙: Individual generator real power output 
𝑄𝑔,𝑙: Individual generator reactive power output 
𝑃𝑔,𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥: Maximum real power output of generator 
𝑄𝑔,𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥: Maximum reactive power output of generator when 𝑄𝑔,𝑙 is positive; 
minimum reactive power output of generator when 𝑄𝑔,𝑙 is negative  
𝑘𝑔𝑒𝑛−𝑙: 1 when generator is off, 0 when generator is on 
 
 The aggregation of VIs calculated for the buses, lines and generators are used to 
determine the vulnerable elements/areas of the power system. 
 
𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =∑𝑆𝑉𝐼𝐵𝑢𝑠,𝑖 +∑𝑆𝑉𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒,𝑗 +∑𝑆𝑉𝐼𝐺𝑒𝑛,𝑙 
(4.8) 
 
As mentioned in section 4.2.2, the edge and vertex betweenness centrality can be 
used as measures to rank their influence in a given graph network. The higher betweenness 
centrality value of an element implies its relatively higher importance comparing to other 
elements within the graph. Considering the power system as a graph network 
(section 4.2.1), the betweenness centrality indices can be calculated for all buses and 
transmission lines to identify their impact on the system. Thus, these indices could be 
utilized as weights for the proposed SOVI module formulated within (4.5) to (4.8).  
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Since transmission lines are modeled as edges of the graph network, 𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒,𝑗 values 
are calculated based on vertex betweenness centrality (𝐵𝐶(𝑣)). While generators and 
buses are represented as nodes of the graph, 𝑊𝑃𝑔,𝑙 and 𝑊𝑉,𝑖 values are obtained based on 
edge betweenness centrality (𝐵𝐶(𝑒)).  By growing the size of power system, the 
normalized edge and vertex betweenness centrality indices are defined to avoid large 
values. 
 
𝐵𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑣) =
𝐵𝐶(𝑣)
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)
 (4.9) 
𝐵𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑒) =
𝐵𝐶(𝑒)
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)
 (4.10) 
 
where 𝑛 is the total number of nodes in the power system. Finally, the weights associated 
with the elements of SOVI module formulated in (4.5) to (4.8) are obtained as follows:  
 Obtaining power flow direction from power flow analysis; 
 Building the directed graph representation of the power system;  
 Obtaining shortest paths between each pairs of vertices; 
 Determining sum of all fractions of shortest paths that pass through the vertex in 
question for all pairs of vertices to obtain betweenness centrality index for that 
vertex; 
 Extending this calculation to all the vertices and edges to get the betweenness 
centralities of whole network using (4.3) and (4.4);  
 Normalizing betweenness centralities indices using (4.9) and (4.10);  
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4.3.2 Case Study 
The IEEE 39-bus test system is used to demonstrate the performance of proposed 
SOVI tool. Figure 4.5 shows the IEEE 39-bus system configuration. The detailed system 
configuration and base power flow data can be found in [84]. The power flow results 
obtained using MATPOWER package [85] is used along with system topology data to 
derive the directed graph model of the IEEE 39-bus test system. Once the adjacency matrix 
is calculated using (4.2), the vertex and edge betweenness centrality indices are calculated 
to rank the influence of each bus and transmission line, respectively. Figure 4.6.a and 
Figure 4.6.b depict the distributions of vertex and edge betweenness centrality for all buses 
and transmission lines, respectively. 
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Figure 4.5 IEEE 39-bus test system 
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(a) 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.6 Vertex and edge betweenness distribution for IEEE 39-bus System 
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Analysis of Figure 4.6 demonstrates that few buses and transmission lines have 
higher betweenness centrality values, which means they have significantly higher 
importance compared to the remaining parts of the system. The betweenness centrality 
values calculated for larger systems proved that the above statement holds for a real size 
system, too. In this example, buses 16 and 17 and the transmission line between them have 
the highest betweenness centrality values which could be observed from their topological 
positions in the system shown in Figure 4.5.  
Table 3 shows the output of the SOVI tool for the three cases under different load 
conditions. In Case 1, the simulation is performed using base load. In Cases 2 and 3, all 
active and reactive loads were multiplied by ratios of 1.1 and 1.25, respectively. 
Simulations have been performed using OPAL-RT real time simulator by modeling 
system within RT-LAB software environment. In each case, the SOVI tool outputs were 
selected after the system reached to the steady state condition. Table 3 shows the results 
of individual SOVI elements including 𝑆𝑉𝐼𝐵𝑢𝑠, 𝑆𝑉𝐼𝐺𝑒𝑛 and 𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒, as well as  𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙. 
It can be seen from Table 3 that the output of SOVI tool increases as the load level 
is increased which indicates that the power system becomes more vulnerable.  
 
 
 
TABLE 3 SOVI VALUES UNDER DIFFERENT LOAD CONDITIONS 
Case no. 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝑩𝒖𝒔 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝑮𝒆𝒏 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 
1 0.9567 4.2090 6.0933 11.2590 
2 1.0728 6.6529 8.2157 15.9414 
3 1.3841 10.0448 11.7686 23.1975 
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The results of simulations for several N-1 and N-2 static contingency analysis are 
listed in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, only those 
transmission line outages which results in non-islanding contingency scenarios are 
considered. As it was expected, the SOVI values in all contingency cases of both tables 
are higher than the normal condition (case 1 in Table 3) which means that the entire power 
system is more vulnerable under the contingency scenarios compare to normal situation. 
It can be also observed that the SOVI values in Table 5 are relatively higher than those in 
Table 4, which indicate that the system is more vulnerable under “N-2” contingency 
condition. These case studies prove the effectiveness of the proposed SOVI tool in detection 
of system vulnerability to assess the system security under different contingency and loading 
scenarios.  
For a large power system, the SOVI tool can be developed for different areas of 
the system in order to detect its vulnerable areas with more precision. Additional testing 
of the SOVI tool using a larger network is performed in section 7.   
 
 
 
 Table 4 SOVI Values for N-1 Contingency Analysis  
Case no. Line ID 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝑩𝒖𝒔 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝑮𝒆𝒏 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 
1 L26 (16-17) 1.4856 18.1091 16.4219 36.0166 
2 L16 (8-9) 1.3942 14.3360 13.4896 29.2198 
3 L7 (3-18) 1.3907 15.5508 10.2731 27.2146 
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TABLE 5 SOVI VALUES FOR N-2 CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS  
Case no. Line ID 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝑩𝒖𝒔 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝑮𝒆𝒏 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝑺𝑽𝑰𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 
1 
L13 (6-11) 
L6 (3-4) 
2.2534 25.3691 27.0581 54.6806 
2 
L26 (16-17) 
L11 (5-8) 
2.3217 26.5410 23.7194 52.5821 
3 
L42 (26-27) 
L28 (16-21) 
1.8914 21.7269 18.1137 41.7320 
 
 
 
 Synchrophasor Based Online Fault Identification Module 
Electromechanical wave oscillations originated following a disturbance propagate 
through power system with speed much lower than electromagnetic travelling waves [86]-
[89]. Electromechanical waveforms are characterized by phase angle modulation of 
voltages and currents with much lower frequency (0.1–10.0 Hz) than electromagnetic 
transients (>100 kHz) [90], [91]. Therefore, they could be detected by looking into phasor 
measurement captured by PMUs or other IEDs which can report phasors. Since these 
waves propagate through different paths in power system, they reach the remote buses 
with distinct time delays which solely depend on the paths’ length and propagation speed 
of wave through each path. As shown in Figure 4.7, the proposed SOFI module which 
uses the synchrophasor measurements collected at the control center operates within the 
following steps [92]: 
 The system topology and location of PMUs are used to run one-time offline 
computation using Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm [93] to build the “shortest 
Path Database”. 
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 The synchrophasor streams measured by PMUs (or other PMU enabled devices 
such as digital protective relays (DPRs) or digital fault recorders (DFRs)) at 
different substations are collected by substation Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) 
and transferred through communication links to the control center PDC and stored 
at synchrophasor PI historian database.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Overall structure of the SOFI tool 
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 The phasor angle measured by PMUs are extracted from PI database and 
continuously monitored. If any disturbance occurs in the system, the Time of 
Arrival (ToA) of electromechanical wave from the disturbance location to each 
PMU location is determined.  
 An optimization method is used to minimize the difference between measured ToA 
and the “shortest path database”. The outcome of optimization module is either the 
location of bus where load/generation outages occurred or the two-end buses of 
the faulty line.  
 If the disturbance type is determined as fault, the binary search algorithm will be 
used to pinpoint the location of fault within the faulty line. 
 
4.4.1 Electromechanical Wave Propagation Phenomena 
When a disturbance occurs on a transmission line, electrical power flow changes 
in the network. This leads to a mismatch between electrical and mechanical torque of 
generators located in the vicinity. Therefore, each generator rotor angle changes to 
compensate the mismatch. Following the generators’ rotor angle changes, the adjacent 
generator buses also encounter changes in their generators’ rotor angle which again causes 
a mismatch in the electrical torque of other adjacent generators. In this fashion, the 
oscillation known as the electromechanical wave propagation is “seen” throughout the 
entire network. Electromechanical oscillations could be detected by monitoring phasor 
angle of bus voltages and characterized with much lower frequency (0.1–10.0Hz) than 
electromagnetic transients (>100 kHz) [86]. To illustrate the concept, a simple power-
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system model in the form of a ring is used. Figure 4.8 shows the 64-generator ring system 
introduced in [86], which comprises 64 identical serially connected generators through 
identical transmission lines, forming a ring. The initial bus angles are evenly distributed 
from 0 to 360 degrees by steps equal to 360/64=5.625 degrees. Due to homogeneity and 
ring shape of the 64-bus system, it is well-suited to study basic aspects of 
electromechanical wave propagation phenomena [94], [95].  
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Figure 4.8 64-generator ring system 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the phasor angle of 64-buses (in radian) with respect to time of a 
given disturbance occurring at bus 16 at t=0. Following the change in the angle of bus 
16th shown by the dashed line in Figure 4.9, the other generators react in a similar fashion, 
but with a certain time delay. Plotting all the bus angles together, this time delay can be 
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represented as a wave modulated on voltage phase angle of buses, which travels away 
from the disturbance source into the network at a finite speed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Bus angle modulation following a fault at bus 16 at t=0 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Fault Location Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, electromechanical wave originated following a disturbance 
travels with finite velocity in a given network. Since these waves propagate through 
different paths, they reach remote buses with distinct time delays which depend on each 
path length and propagation speed of wave through that path. Therefore, one can 
determine the fault location by using ToA measurements at various locations along with 
supporting information to determine each path’s length and speed of propagation through 
that path.  
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The proposed method detects ToA of electromechanical waves modulated on 
phasor angle of voltage at selected buses where PMUs are available. Then the well-known 
Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm [93] is deployed combined with several mathematical 
steps to detect the faulty line. Finally location of the fault will be determined inside faulty 
line using binary search method. Details of the method are explained next.   
4.4.2.1 ToA and Fault Type Detection  
An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) method has been developed to detect ToA 
of electromechanical wave modulated on phase angle of voltage based on analyzing the 
first swing of the phase angle at buses where PMUs are installed. The proposed ANN 
method has been selected due to an initial assessment that this method provides higher 
accuracy and faster decision making outcome when compared to other pattern recognition 
methods which have been studied. Other methods should be explored in the future. One 
time calculation utilizing numerous training data sets on ANN implemented using 
MATLAB ANN toolbox led to an accurate ToA detector.  
To develop the ToA detector, supervised training is used to train the ANN module. 
Figure 4.10 shows the overall structure of deployed ANN module. To differentiate 
between faults and other disturbances as well as different types of fault, three types of 
input signals were defined in the input layer. The phase angles of each three phase 
voltages, as well as their first and second time derivatives were selected as inputs. The 
inputs and desired outputs were compared in a hidden layer and errors are then propagated 
back through the system. The performance of system is calculated in terms of number of 
neurons in the hidden layer, and 4 neurons are selected as it provides the best result. The 
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back propagation algorithm causes the ANN system to tweak weights which control the 
neural network [96]. This process occurs continually till the weights are adjusted within a 
defined threshold.  
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Figure 4.10 The network structure of the back propagation neural network model 
 
 
 
The multilayer perceptron neural network with back propagation algorithm used 
in this study is one of most common ANN method applied in power system. The desired 
output of the ANN is the event type and ToA of the electromechanical wave modulated 
on voltage phase angle. 
In the ANN training process, a set of 2000 events were created within IEEE 118 
bus test system [97]. In the training process, all lines are considered to be in service. 
Training scenarios include generator and load outages, various types of faults with 
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different fault resistance at different locations. Then, another set of 500 previously unseen 
randomly generated event scenarios (ratio of unseen test cases to trained cases is equal to 
0.25) were created to test and validate ANN-based ToA and fault type detector. Since the 
nature of electromechanical wave oscillation propagation and its related phase angle 
modulation is same for different networks, the ANN based ToA detector can be used for 
any given network as it has been demonstrated in section 7. 
4.4.2.2 Detection of Faulty Line 
Once the ToA of electromechanical wave oscillation is obtained at selected buses 
where PMUs are installed, it can be used to determine the faulty line. Several mathematic 
steps as described below must be deployed before the faulty line could be detected.   
Computation of line propagation delay: The speed of electromechanical wave 
propagation is quite lower compared to electromagnetic one, which is close to speed of 
light. The researchers proved that applying continuum approach, the speed of 
electromechanical wave propagation through the network solely depends on system 
parameters and can be obtained as follows [86].   
 
𝑣 = √
𝜔 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃
2ℎ|𝑧|
 (4.11) 
 
where 𝜔  is  the  nominal  system  frequency,  𝜃 is  the  line impedance angle (~90°), ℎ is 
the inertia constant of generator and |𝑧| is the line impedance. Therefore, the propagation 
delay of each line in the network can be calculated by: 
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𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦−𝐿 =
𝑥𝐿
√
𝜔 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃
2ℎ|𝑧|
 
(4.12) 
 
where L=1,…,k represents each transmission line in the network and xL is the total length 
of line L. Assuming that length and impedance of transmission lines are known, 
electromechanical wave propagation delay through each transmission line can be 
calculated using (4.12). 
Calculation of measured ToA matrix: Figure 4.11 is used to explain computation 
of the shortest time delay matrix. As shown in Figure 4.11, for the given network assume 
that PMU measurements are available at buses A, B, C and D, while a fault occurs at an 
unknown bus k (this assumption will be removed later). The propagation delay of 
electromechanical wave to reach bus A after fault occurs at bus k can be obtained by: 
 
𝑡𝐴𝑘 = 𝑡𝐴 − 𝑡𝑘  (4.13) 
 
where 𝑡𝑘 represents fault initiation time at bus 𝑘, 𝑡𝐴 represents ToA of electromechanical 
wave at bus 𝐴 and 𝑡𝐴𝑘 is the propagation delay of electromechanical wave to arrive at bus 
𝐴. Since the fault initiation time 𝑡𝑘 is unknown, it is impossible to obtain 𝑡𝐴𝑘. Suppose 
that bus 𝐴 is the first to receive the propagated wave. It can be used as the time reference.  
Therefore, the wave propagation delay from bus k to bus 𝐵 with respect to ToA of 
electromechanical wave at bus 𝐴 (𝑡𝐴) can be defined as: 
 
𝑡𝐵𝐴 = 𝑡𝐵𝑘 − 𝑡𝐴𝑘 = (𝑡𝐵 − 𝑡𝑘) − (𝑡𝐴 − 𝑡𝑘) = 𝑡𝐵 − 𝑡𝐴  (4.14) 
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Figure 4.11 Illustration of theoretical and measured delay matrices  
 
 
 
It should be noted that (4.14) is always correct due to the fact that the 
electromechanical waves propagate along the transmission lines is always following the 
shortest path rule. 
The electromechanical wave propagation delay from bus 𝑘 to other buses with 
respect to ToA of electromechanical wave at bus 𝐴 (𝑡𝐴) can be defined similar to (4.14). 
Hence, the measured propagation time delay matrix can be defined as: 
 
𝑇𝑚 = [𝑡𝐵𝐴 𝑡𝐶𝐴 𝑡𝐷𝐴] (4.15) 
 
Calculation of theoretical time delay matrix: Since the propagation delay of each 
transmission line is known by (4.12), vector of time differences resulting from the shortest 
propagation delay could be computed as follows. 
𝑇𝑠𝑝−𝑥 = [𝜏𝐵𝑥 − 𝜏𝐴𝑥 𝜏𝐶𝑥 − 𝜏𝐴𝑥 𝜏𝐷𝑥 − 𝜏𝐴𝑥] (4.16) 
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where 𝜏𝐴𝑥, 𝜏𝐵𝑥, 𝜏𝐶𝑥 and 𝜏𝐷𝑥 are  the  theoretical  shortest propagation time delay from  
buses 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 and 𝐷 to any arbitrary bus 𝑥, respectively. It can be rewritten as: 
 
 𝑇𝑠𝑝−𝑥 = [𝜏𝐵𝐴𝑥 𝜏𝐶𝐴𝑥 𝜏𝐷𝐴𝑥]  (4.17) 
 
The shortest time delay path for each bus pair is computed utilizing the Dijkstra's 
algorithm. One time computation of (4.17) with Dijkstra's algorithm is valid for a given 
topology before any line switching takes place. After any topology changes, the 
calculation must be repeated to update the matrix elements. 
Definition of minimum error function: As shown in Figure 4.11, if the fault 
occurs at unknown bus 𝑘, the calculated 𝑇𝑠𝑝−𝑘 should identically match 𝑇𝑚 captured by 
ToA detectors. Therefore, one can define 𝑃𝑥 as follows and then check it for all buses to 
find the bus that corresponds to the minimum (zero) 𝑃𝑥 value. 
 
𝑃𝑥 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛(‖𝑇𝑠𝑝−𝑥 − 𝑇𝑚‖)  𝑥 = 1,… , 𝑛  (4.18) 
 
where 𝑥 = 1,… , 𝑛 is the total number of buses and 𝑃𝑥 is the minimum norm linked with 
bus 𝑥. 
As previously stated, we assumed that faults only take place at buses, which is not 
realistic in actual power system. Consequently, the methodology must be revised, so that 
the method can be applied for any arbitrary fault located along transmission lines.  
As shown in Figure 4.11, if the fault occurs at an arbitrary point f, two buses 
corresponding to the minimum two values obtained from (4.18) will be selected. The 
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network topology will be checked to see if this pair of buses has a direct link to each other. 
If so, the line connecting these two buses will be declared as faulty line.   
If there is no direct link between the two buses, then each line connected to the two 
buses will be considered as the faulty line candidate. Hence, fault location calculation must 
be repeated for all possible candidates which can be tolerated due to limited number of 
lines connected to the pair of suspect buses.  
4.4.2.3 Fault Location Using Binary Search 
Once the faulty line is determined, the exact location of fault can be derived by 
adding fictitious buses and dividing the faulty line into two line segments using binary 
search approach [96]. As shown in Figure 4.12, the first fictitious bus divides the faulty 
line (𝑚 − 𝑘) into two equal sections (𝑎1 −𝑚 and 𝑎1 − 𝑘). Then, (4.18) will be 
recalculated for 𝑥 = 𝑎1, 𝑚 and 𝑘. Then, the two buses which correspond to lowest 𝑃𝑥 
values will be treated as faulty section. Similarly, the second fictitious bus divides the 
faulty section (𝑎1 − 𝑘 in Figure 4.12) into equal sections (𝑎1 − 𝑘 and 𝑎2 − 𝑘) and so on.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Illustration of the binary search used for fault location method 
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If this process occurs over and over, mathematically, after adding 𝑖𝑡ℎ fictitious bus, 
the location of fault will be determined within the following error: 
 
𝐸 = (
1
2𝑖
) × 100 (4.19) 
 
In this study, we considered adding 5 fictitious buses to reach accuracy greater 
than 99%. 
4.4.3 Case Study 
In this section, the proposed SOFI method is tested using IEEE118 bus test system 
(Figure 4.13) [98]. The proposed methodology does not require optimal PMU placement. 
To avoid an arbitrary placement of PMUs, suggested optimal PMU placement studied in 
[99] is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method for a given PMU 
optimal placement driven by other applications. Designing an optimal PMU placement 
considering electromechanical wave propagation based fault location as a driving reason 
for the PMU placement decision could be a future work of this study. 
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Figure 4.13 Testing SOFI tool with IEEE 118-bus test system 
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4.4.3.1 Testing with Different Fault Scenarios 
 In this subsection, the proposed method is tested by changing fault parameters 
(fault resistance, fault distance, fault type and faulty line). Table 6 brings summary of 
results for a few test cases. In all cases, the proposed method correctly detects fault type 
using proposed ANN module and then identifies faulty lines.  
 
 
 
TABLE 6 FAULT LOCATION RESULTS UNDER DIFFERENT FAULT SPECIFICATION 
Case no. Faulty line 
Fault  
type 
Fault 
resistance (Ω) 
Fault distance 
(p.u.)  
Fault location 
error (%) 
1 
19-20 
a-g 
1 
0.1 0.73 
2 0.5 0.59 
3 0.9 0.34 
4 
20 
0.1 1.23 
5 0.5 0.92 
6 0.9 0.74 
7 
ab-g 
1 
0.1 0.56 
8 0.5 0.51 
9 0.9 0.49 
10 
20 
0.1 0.84 
11 0.5 0.83 
12 0.9 0.77 
13 
100-106 
ab 
1 
0.1 0.44 
14 0.5 0.47 
15 0.9 0.62 
16 
20 
0.1 0.75 
17 0.5 0.67 
18 0.9 0.93 
19 
 abc-g 
1 
0.1 0.17 
20 0.5 0.14 
21 0.9 0.15 
22 
20 
0.1 1.11 
23 0.5 0.96 
24 0.9 1.04 
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Furthermore, the associated fault location error for each case demonstrates that the 
proposed method is able to accurately locate faults (in most cases error is within 1%).  
Figure 4.14 represents the phasor angle captured by PMUs related to cases 6, 13 
and 20 from Table 6 (only 4 phasor angles from PMUs with smallest ToAs were plotted 
to avoid confusion).   
In Figure 4.14.a, the electromechanical wave oscillation following the fault (a-g 
with 20Ω at 0.9 pu from bus 19) on line 19-20 is first detected at bus 21 at t=5.43 sec and 
then detected at buses 15, 23 and 17, respectively.  
In Figure 4.14.b, the electromechanical wave following the fault (ab with 1Ω at 
0.1 pu from bus 19) on line 19-20 is first detected at bus 21 at t=5.97 sec and then detected 
at buses 15, 17 and 30, respectively.  
In Figure 4.14.c, the electromechanical wave following the fault (abc-g with 1Ω at 
0.5 pu from bus 100) on line 100-106 is first detected at bus 94 at t=5.66 sec and then 
detected at buses 105, 110 and 80, respectively. In each case, after detection of ToAs of 
electromechanical wave oscillations at PMU locations, 𝑇𝑚 and 𝑃𝑥 will be calculated from 
(13) and (16), respectively.  
The location of faults for these three examples are calculated using proposed 
binary search method with error equal to 0.74%, 0.44% and 0.14%, respectively. 
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(a) Case 6 
 
(b) Case 13 
 
(c) Case 20 
Figure 4.14 Phasor angle of PMU equipped buses of IEEE118 bus system 
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Table 7 shows the average error percentage of the proposed fault location method 
under numerous test cases. As depicted in Figure 4.13, IEEE 118 bus system can be 
divided into three areas with almost same number of PMUs. We considered 9 points to 
insert faults (0.1pu to 0.9pu with span of 0.1pu) on every single line in these three areas. 
It can be concluded from results in Table 7 that area 1 which has higher ratio of PMU to 
line (0.216) is linked with least average error. However, area 2 which has lower ratio of 
PMU to line (0.147) has the highest average error.  
 
 
 
TABLE 7 FAULT LOCATION RESULTS ON DIFFERENT REGIONS 
Area Number of lines Number of PMUs PMU/Line ratio 
Fault location 
error (%) 
Area 1 51 11 0.216 0.352 
Area 2 68 10 0.147 0.978 
Area 3 67 11 0.164 0.754 
Total 186 32 0.172 0.724 
 
 
 
4.4.3.2 Impact of PMU Bad Data 
One of the main concerns for applications based on wide area measurements is the 
accuracy and calibration of PMUs. Since PMU measurements might be affected by 
inaccuracy of algorithms, or by being out of calibration, different test cases were simulated 
by artificially adding error to phasor angle measurements. 
Figure 4.15 shows the average percent error of proposed fault location method 
under three main scenarios. In scenario 1, first column represents the average percent error 
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corresponding to 20 fault cases simulated in area 1 (see Figure 4.13), while the 
manipulated PMU measurements are among PMUs within area 1. Similarly, the second 
and third columns show the average percent errors corresponding to same faults in area 1, 
while the manipulated PMU measurements are within area 2 and 3, respectively. It can be 
seen that the effect of PMU bad data is felt when the affected PMUs are in the same area 
where the faults are located. The same can be concluded from the second and third 
scenarios where faults occurred in area 2 and area 3, respectively. Finally, from the results 
one can conclude that PMU bad data will affect the accuracy of proposed fault location. 
However, the methodology is still able to operate within acceptable error (less than 2%).  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.15 Fault location percent error under effect of PMU bad data 
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4.4.3.3 Impact of Topology Changes 
Following a topology change, two situations could be considered for the proposed 
fault location method. First, the shortest path database of proposed method will be 
recalculated considering updated information on system current topology. Second, due to 
unrelated reasons, current topology of system may not be updated. Table 8 shows the result 
of simulations which have been carried out by switching off lines and simulating faults to 
address the impact of topology change on the fault location method.  
 
 
 
TABLE 8 IMPACT OF TOPOLOGY CHANGES AND PMU AVAILABILITY 
Case no. Faulty line 
Two Switched 
lines 
Two 
Unavailable 
PMUs Location  
Error before 
changes (%) 
Error after 
changes (%) 
Switched lines do not contribute in shortest path 
1 1-2 55-59, 24-70 49, 71 0.32 0.32 
2 1-2 55-59, 24-70 9, 21 0.32 0.41 
3 41-42 3-5, 78-79 1, 110 0.86 0.86 
4 41-42 3-5, 78-79 35, 56 0.86 1.07 
5 76-118 5-6, 37-39 17, 40 0.49 0.49 
6 76-118 5-6, 37-39 71, 94 0.49 0.70 
Switched lines contributes in shortest path but located far from fault point 
7 1-2 20-21, 28-29 49, 71 0.32 0.32 
8 1-2 20-21, 28-29 9, 21 0.32 0.46 
9 41-42 15-17, 69-77 1, 110 0.86 0.86 
10 41-42 15-17, 69-77 35, 56 0.86 1.11 
11 76-118 22-23, 47-69 17, 40 0.49 0.49 
12 76-118 22-23, 47-69 71, 94 0.49 0.71 
Switched lines contributes in shortest path and located close to fault point 
13 1-2 5-8, 2-12 49, 71 0.32 0.76 
14 1-2 5-8, 2-12 9, 21 0.32 1.48 
15 41-42 34-43, 47-49 1, 110 0.86 1.44 
16 41-42 34-43, 47-49 35, 56 0.86 2.89 
17 76-118 76-77, 94-96 17, 40 0.49 1.63 
18 76-118 76-77, 94-96 71, 94 0.49 2.01 
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The simulation results illustrate that fault location method would be affected only 
in certain cases where the line being switched off is contributing in the shortest path of 
electromechanical wave propagation from fault to buses with PMUs. The fault location 
error is acceptable if the switched line is far from the faulty line. As described in previous 
subsection, PMUs which are far from faulty line cannot dramatically affect output of the 
proposed method. To detect a topology change, a pre-defined signal (ping) could be 
generated at one of the PMU equipped buses and ToAs are measured at other PMU 
locations. If there is any difference between one of the measured ToAs and corresponding 
calculated ToAs, a topology change across the shortest path among corresponding two 
buses is determined. 
4.4.3.4 Impact of Availability of PMUs 
The other concern associated with wide area measurements based applications is 
unavailability of PMUs due to various reasons such as communication failure, device 
failure, etc. In such cases, applications must be robust enough to tolerate missing 
measurements from one or more PMUs. 
Figure 4.16 depicts the average percent error of fault location algorithm versus the 
total number of PMUs assumed to be out of service. After taking each PMU out of service, 
20 faults are simulated and average percent error is calculated to plot Figure 4.16.  Similar 
to previous subsection, three main scenarios were simulated considering three areas in 
Figure 4.13. In Figure 4.16.a, faults are simulated in area 1, while dash, dash-dot and 
dotted lines are related to the cases where out of service PMUs are within areas 1, 2 and 
3, respectively.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 4.16 Effect of unavailability of PMUs on fault location accuracy  
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As it can be seen, the average percent error is less than 2% (dashed line) even after 
removing first 6 PMUs from area 1. It can be concluded that even under availability of 5 
PMUs in area 1, the method operates with acceptable accuracy. The error remains under 
2% even after removing all PMUs in areas 2 and 3, respectively. The same observation 
could be obtained by looking into Figure 4.16.b and Figure 4.16.c. It can be concluded 
that fault location method on each of the three areas is robust to unavailability of PMUs 
in other two areas. Since optimal fault location results may be sensitive to placement of 
PMUs and location of fault occurrence, one can conclude that the proposed method can 
operate within acceptable error (< 3%) with quite lower number of PMUs than what is 
needed to satisfy the observability requirement suggested by an optimal PMU placement.  
The last scenario is designed to consider the impact of combination of topology 
changes and PMU availability on the accuracy of fault location method. Table 9 shows 
the result of fault location method by inserting faults at three different lines while two 
lines and two PMUs are taken out.  
In cases 1 and 2, faults occurred on line 1-2 (area 1) while lines (55-59 and 24-70) 
are taken out but are not contributing to the shortest path to PMUs. In case 1 where the 
two out of service PMUs (49, 71) are not located in the same area as fault, the fault location 
error remains the same. In case 2 where the two out of service PMUs (49, 71) are located 
in the same area as fault, the fault location error slightly increases from 0.32% to 0.41%.  
In cases 7 and 8, all simulation parameters are the same except switched lines 
which are selected from those that contribute to the shortest path but are located far from 
the fault point. Similarly, in cases 13 and 14, all simulation parameters are the same except 
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the switched lines are selected from those that contribute to the shortest path and are 
located close to the fault point.  
From Table 9, it can be concluded that the fault location accuracy would not be 
affected if PMUs or lines out of service are away from the fault point. The errors would 
be tolerable even if the out of service PMUs and lines are in the same area where the fault 
has occurred.    
 
 
 
TABLE 9 IMPACT OF TOPOLOGY CHANGES ON FAULT LOCATION 
Case no. Faulty line 
Switched off 
line 
Error before topology 
change (%) 
Error after topology 
change (%) 
Switched line does not contribute in shortest path 
1 1-2 55-59 0.32 0.32 
2 25-27 34-37 0.44 0.44 
3 41-42 78-79 0.86 0.86 
4 76-118 37-39 0.49 0.49 
5 110-112 12-117 0.97 0.97 
Switched line contributes in shortest path but located far from fault point 
6 1-2 20-21 0.32 0.47 
7 25-27 63-64 0.44 0.61 
8 41-42 15-17 0.86 0.89 
9 76-118 47-69 0.49 0.93 
10 110-112 68-81 0.97 0.99 
Switched line contributes in shortest path and located close to fault point 
11 1-2 3-5 0.32 - 
12 25-27 27-28 0.44 5.98 
13 41-42 40-41 0.86 7.41 
14 76-118 77-82 0.49 4.75 
15 110-112 94-100 0.97 3.64 
 
70 
 
 Conclusion 
In this section, two synchrophasor based tools have been proposed, one  to monitor 
the system in real time, and the other one to alarm operators and corresponding automated 
control schemes to initiate remedial actions, once a series of outages is detected. The SOVI 
tool provides vital information regarding vulnerability of the different areas of the system 
which will be later used as decision making variables to trigger other tools to prevent un-
wanted islands and blackouts. The SOFI tool detects disturbances, and provides immediate 
topology update. So the error caused by divergence of conventional state estimator under 
some contingency scenarios could be avoided. 
These tools have been tested against various scenarios and their reliable 
performance was demonstrated.    
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5. SYNCHROPHASOR BASED ISLANDING PREDICTION TOOL  
 Overview 
The steady state progression stage of cascading outages is an important period, 
since the system operators may have enough time to evaluate the system condition, 
identify some vulnerable contingencies, and take some control actions to increase the 
security level. In this section, a two-step islanding prediction method to inform the 
operator regarding possibility of un-wanted island formation, namely SIP tool, is studied.  
 Generation of the Offline Islanding Database 
5.2.1 Observability Matrix 
The proposed two step SIP method starts with creation of an islanding database 
which later can be used to generate the training dataset for the proposed Adaptive Neural 
Network (ANN) module. Due to the limited number of the actual islanding cases occurring 
in a given power system, it is vital to generate accurate simulated islanding scenarios in 
order to train the ANN module.  
In power systems, the term “observability” is defined as the possibility of 
accessing one bus from any other bus in the system [100]. Also, the term “depth of 
observability” of a system is referred to as the maximum length of the shortest path 
between any two buses in that system. Next, we describe that how the incidence matrix 
which has been introduced in section 4 can be used to obtain observability matrix and 
depth of observability of a system.  
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For instance, consider the IEEE 9-bus system shown in Figure 5.1.  It can be easily 
seen from the figure that:  
 The system is observable, since there is a way to access any given bus in the system 
from any other buses in the system; 
 The depth of observability is equal to 4, meaning that any given bus in this system 
can be accessed from any other buses within 4 steps or less.  
In this case, it was easy to determine the system observability and its depth, but for 
a larger system, it won’t be feasible to manually obtain the depth of observability. 
To systematically determine the system observability and its depth, we first explain 
how the incidence matrix which has been introduced in section 4 can be used to define the 
observability matrix [101].  
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Figure 5.1 IEEE 9-bus test system 
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The kth depth observability matrix is defined as below: 
 
𝐶𝑛×𝑛
𝑘 = {𝑐𝑖𝑗} 𝑐𝑖𝑗 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑖𝑠 ≤ 𝑘 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (5.1) 
 
With this definition, one can realize that the 1st depth observability matrix is equal 
to the incidence matrix. The kth depth observability matrix can be obtained by computing 
the kth power of the system incidence matrix and change all non-zero elements to 1. All 
diagonal elements of the observability matrix are equal to 1, which imply each bus is 
observable by itself. 
For example, the 1st depth observability matrix of the system in Figure 5.1 can be 
obtained using definition of incidence matrix in (4.1). 
 
𝐶1 = 𝐴 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 2nd depth observability matrix is calculated by computing (A×A) and replacing 
all non-zero elements with 1. 
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𝐶2 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The elements of 2nd depth observability matrix is equal to one if the shortest path 
between the two corresponding buses is ≤ 2. For example, the shortest paths between bus 
1 and buses 4, 5 and 6 are equal to 1, 2 and 2, respectively. Consequently, the associated 
elements of  𝐶2 are (C2(1,4), C2(1,5), C2(1,6), C2(4,1), C2(5,1), C2(6,1)) equal to 1. 
Similarly, the 3rd and 4th depth system observability matrices can be obtained as 
below: 
 
𝐶3 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐶4 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen that all elements of 4th depth system observability matrix is equal to 
1, which verifies the earlier conclusion obtained by manual investigation. 
Now that the concept of observability matrix has been explained, we use another 
example to show how it can be used to create islanding database for the purpose of training 
the ANN method which will be discussed later in this section. 
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 In Figure 5.2, the IEEE 9-bus system is modified by switching off the lines (5-7) 
and (6-9). The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th depth observability matrices of the modified system are 
equal to:  
𝐶1 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐶2 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐶3 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐶4 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen that the 𝐶3 and 𝐶4 are equal to each other, which means that the 
final depth matrix is 𝐶3. Despite the first example, in this case all elements of the final 
depth observability matrix are not equal to 1. By digging into 𝐶3 as shown below, one can 
realize that five diagonal blocks are formed (bus 1, bus 2, bus 3, buses 4-6, buses 7-9).  
𝐶3 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1]
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Figure 5.2 IEEE 9-bus test system 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the off-diagonal blocks show the relationships between each 
diagonal bus group such that if elements are equal to 1, the blocks are in the same island. 
In this example, blocks 1 and 4 which includes buses (1, 4, 5 and 6) are in one island, and 
blocks 2, 3 and 5 which includes buses (2, 3, 7, 8 and 6) are in the other island. This can 
be visually confirmed by looking at Figure 5.2. 
In summary, if all elements of the final observability depth matrix of a system are 
equal to 1, the entire system is connected. If not, the total number of islands as well as 
buses within each of them can be obtained only based on the final observability depth 
matrix. One can use the incidence matrix of a power system to determine all possible 
islanding scenarios in the system. This can be achieved by tripping one line (replacing 
associated 1s with 0s in the incidence matrix) and calculating the final observability depth 
matrix. This process can be expanded by tripping multiple lines and repeating the same 
procedure.  
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5.2.2 Constraints to Reduce the Size of Database 
The complete testing combinations for tripping up to 3 lines in the IEEE 9-bus test 
system with 9 bus and 9 lines is equal to 129. Therefore, the matrix multiplication 
procedure (as described in section 5.2.1) to obtain final observability depth matrix should 
be repeated 129 times. 
 
Iterations = (
9
1
) + (
9
2
) + (
9
3
)=9+36+84=129 (5.2) 
 
Table 10 compares the total number of iterations for different test systems and 
different number of tripped lines without adding any constraints. The number of iterations 
will quickly grow as the size of system and number of tripped lines increases.  
 
 
 
 TABLE 10 ITERATIONS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE ISLANDING SCENARIOS 
 Test systems 
IEEE9-bus IEEE118-bus IEEE300-bus European 1354-bus 
No. 
Tripped 
lines 
1 9 179 306 1751 
2 45 16,110 46,971 1,533,876 
3 129 956,039 4,775,691 894,762,751 
4 255 42,312,915 362,976,231 ~3.91e+11 
 
 
 
Given the fact that for larger systems the size of incidence matrix will also 
increases (which means higher computation burden), the process of islanding database 
creation without defining a proper constraint is infeasible. Numerous unrealistic 
combinations including many infeasible islanding scenarios are taken into account. For 
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instance, if line 1 in Figure 5.3 is tripped, the system will be separated into two islands. 
The same islands will be formed if any of lines 2, 3 and 4 is also tripped along with line 
1. However, tripping line 1 with lines 3 and 4 will result in an infeasible islanding scenario 
due to their geographical and electrical distance to line 1.  
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Figure 5.3 Illustration of infeasible islanding scenarios 
 
 
 
Since the concept of observation depth is closely aligned with the geographical 
and electrical distances, it can be used to limit the search area in creation of the island 
scenarios. The certain geographical and electrical distance could be equivalently 
converted by certain observation depth n. Changing the value of n indicates involving 
larger/smaller area geographically and/or implementing a longer/shorter hidden failure 
chain [100].  
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Using observability depth as the constraint can tremendously reduce the 
computational burden by eliminating those unrealistic cases. For instance, by setting the 
depth of observation to k=5, the number combinations for up to 3 tripped lines in the 1354-
bus system in Table 10 will be limited to less than 40,000. Therefore, the number of 
combinations will be less than 0.00005 of total one.   
 Adaptive Neural Network Module to Predict Islands 
The underlying hypothesis in this method is to perform a data mining process 
based on measurements provided by PMUs to predict islanding before it occurs. A series 
of dynamic simulations of various islanding scenarios is used to train a neural network 
model in offline mode. Once the model has been tested and validated in offline mode, it 
can be used in real time to predict islanding scenarios in the system. 
5.3.1 Application of Neural Networks in Power Systems 
The neural network consist of a number of neurons at different layers which have 
different types of interactions together. The processing time and complexity of the neural 
network model including the number of layers or neurons are closely related to proper 
selection of the optimization process and the minimization goal of the layers [102]. 
In recent decades, the neural network has been widely used for various power 
system applications, and in many cases offered superior performance over the prior 
methods. These ANN methods were able to perform complex mapping and incorporating 
several input values to obtain a single system response which is the desired output for 
many power system applications.  
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In [103], an ANN model is defined as a topology recognition tool to find irregular 
topologies. The developed ANN model consists of 3 layers and four neurons which 
receives power line flow as input and generates the bus switch state as output. In [104], an 
ANN model to analyze reliability of power systems is proposed which were proved to 
have an accuracy of 99%. Authors claimed that the proposed method could be used in 
online reliability analysis due to its fast performance. 
An ANN based method to enhance steady state security of the power system by 
optimizing the amount and location of reactive power banks is proposed in [105].  The 
maximum load, and reactive generation reserve are used as inputs to a multilayer 
perceptron neural network model. The outputs are defined as best, good, average, and 
poor, which represent the effectiveness of reactive power banks placement for the system 
steady state security.  
In [106], an ANN model as a pattern classifier for operation of distance relay in 
transmission lines is defined. The post fault voltage and current measurements are used as 
input, and the output is defined as the trip command to the circuit breakers. A power 
system restoration method based on ANN concept is proposed in [107]. The method 
contains few island restoration schemes and determines restoration plan based on offline 
trainings.  Authors argued that the proposed requires small amount data storage capacity 
and processing time. 
In [108], authors defined a multi layered feed forward neural network method for 
the short term load forecasting in the power system. In [109] and [110] multi-layer 
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perceptron with back propagation ANN methods are used for precise security system 
prediction and assessment of power systems. 
5.3.2 Formulation of the Proposed ANN Method 
In this study, the proposed ANN pattern recognition method has been selected due 
to its flexibility in finding various connections between inputs and output values which is 
the key concern in development of SIP module. In addition, the supervised learning feature 
allows the training of the ANN module using offline simulations carried out based on 
islanding database. In this section, details of the proposed ANN method are demonstrated. 
The SIP module determines the transient behavior of the system and alarms the operator 
in case of an un-wanted islanding scenario. In the offline mode, the islanding database and 
the SOVI tool proposed in section 4 are used to train the ANN module. Once trained and 
tested offline, the SIP module can be used in real time to predict possible islanding 
scenarios. It should be noted that the major computational burden of the SIP method is 
associated with the offline part which includes creation of the islanding database, islanding 
scenario simulation and the ANN module training and testing. 
The overall scheme of the proposed islanding prediction method is shown in 
Figure 5.4. The proposed SIP module is divided into offline and online stages and operates 
in the following steps: 
 In the offline mode, the system incidence matrix A is created. The incidence matrix 
is a reversible symmetrical matrix that indicates the connectivity within a power 
network.  It has all its diagonal elements (bus elements) equal to 1, which means 
the bus is connected to the system. For each two buses i, j (i≠j) which have 
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transmission line connecting them, the corresponding elements in the A matrix are 
also 1. The rest of matrix elements are 0. 
 The N-th observability of incidence matrix A is obtained by calculating AN where 
the index N is defined to create realistic islanding scenarios. The index N 
represents the electrical distance of islanding scenarios. 
 Once the islanding scenario database is created, simulations are performed for each 
scenario and measurements are captured at PMU locations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Overall structure of SIP module 
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 The power system is divided into M regions (M depends on the size of the system 
and number of available PMUs), and the proposed SOVI module is deployed to 
obtain vulnerability indices in each region. Outputs of SOVI modules for each 
scenario are used as the input to train the ANN method.  
 The supervised learning is used to train the ANN module using the islanding 
database and SOVI modules’ output. The first output of the ANN method is 
defined as a signal in the range of 0 to 1 which shows the possibility of formation 
of at least an islanding scenario. The second output list the critical lines that their 
outage can lead to formation of the islands (to limit the size of simulations, 
contingencies are limited to “N-3”).  
 The synchrophasor streams measured by PMUs (or other PMU enabled devices 
such as digital protective relays (DPRs) or digital fault recorders (DFRs)) at 
different substations are collected by substation Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) 
and transferred through communication links to the control center PDC and stored 
at synchrophasor PI historian database.  
 In the online mode, the trained ANN module is used to monitor the power system 
in real-time and determine areas prone to un-wanted islanding formation. 
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 Case Study 
5.4.1 Offline Analysis 
5.4.1.1 Islanding Database 
The proposed islanding database creation method has been applied to IEEE 118-
bus test system. The computation results are shown in Table 11. The total numbers of 
islanding cases by setting the maximum observability depth to 4 and tripping up to 2 and 
3 lines are 182 and 684, respectively.  
 
 
 
TABLE 11 NUMBER OF ISLANDING SCENARIOS IN IEEE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM  
IEEE 118-bus 
Test System 
Depth of Observability 
2 3 4 
No. 
Tripped 
lines 
Up to 2 49 97 182 
Up to 3 216 472 684 
 
 
 
5.4.1.2 Employing the SOVI Tool   
The IEEE 118-bus test system is divided into 9 regions as depicted in Figure 5.5. 
Each area contains few PMUs which are assumed to send measurements to their regional 
control center.  
85 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Testing SIP tool with IEEE 118-bus test system 
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The SOVI tool is developed at each regional control center using PMU 
measurements and procedures explained in section 4.   
5.4.1.3 Training the ANN Module  
Each SOVI’s output is used as an input to the ANN method. Therefore, the ANN 
input layer consists of 9 nodes as shown in Figure 5.6. The output layer is defined with 9 
nodes where each node is associated with a region shown in Figure 5.5. A zero value at 
an output node indicates that no islanding condition at its corresponding region is 
predicted. While a value of 1 at an output node indicates that an un-wanted islanding 
condition at its corresponding region is predicted. The hidden layer used in this training 
process contains 6 neurons. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Graphical diagram of the ANN method trained for the SIP tool 
     
 
 
 
The training dataset consists of all 684 islanding scenarios obtained in Table 11 
and 1100 non-islanding cases. A script is developed to randomly generate “N-1” 
contingencies, as well as 5-20% overload condition scenarios in different regions. 70% of 
the dataset is used to train the ANN module and the rest is equally allocated to validation 
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and testing parts. Simulations have been carried out in RT-LAB software environment 
using OPAL-RT real time simulator [111]. Virtual PMUs are modeled within the model 
at the given buses as shown in Figure 5.5 and measurements are transferred to control 
center using PDCs. The SOVI module calculates the vulnerability indices at each of 9 
regions. Each SOVI’s output value is selected 10 seconds after the scenario has been 
occurred in order to eliminate the effect of transients on calculations.  
Figure 5.7 indicates the iteration at which the validation performance reached a 
minimum. In the default setup, the training stops after six consecutive increases in 
validation error, and the best performance is taken from the epoch with the lowest 
validation error.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Error vs. epoch for training, validation and test data 
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This figure does not indicate any major problems with the training. The validation 
and test curves are very similar. If the test curve had increased significantly before the 
validation curve increased, then it was possible that some over fitting might have occurred. 
Generally, the error reduces after more epochs of training, but might start to increase on 
the validation data set as the network starts over fitting the training data. 
5.4.2 Online Analysis 
Once islanding database is created and offline simulations are performed to train 
the ANN module, the SIP tool can be deployed online to predict areas prone to formation 
of islands in real time. In order to test the SIP tool in real time, few islanding scenarios are 
simulated as described in Table 12. 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 12 DESCRIPTION OF ISLANDING SCENARIOS   
Case 
no. 
Islanded areas Details of Events 
SIP Tool Output 
1 
Island 1: regions 1, 
2, 3 
Island 2: Rest of the 
System   
 Line 44 (15-33) is tripped at t=10 sec 
 Line 45 (19-34) is tripped at t=20 sec 
 Line 30 (22-24) is tripped at t=30 sec 
 Line 54 (30-38) is tripped at t=40 sec 
 Regions 1, 2 and 3 
are detected to 
form an island at 
t= 33.5 sec 
2 
Island 1: Region 9 
Island 2: Rest of the 
System   
 Line 163 (100-103) is tripped at t=10 sec 
 Line  164 (100-104) is tripped at t=20 
sec 
 Line 167 (100-106) is tripped at t=30 sec 
 Region 9 is 
detected to form 
an island at t=22.8 
sec 
3 
Island 1: Part of 
Region 3 
Island 2: Rest of the 
System   
 Line 41 (23-32) is tripped at t=10 sec 
 Line  33 (25-27) is tripped at t=20 sec 
 Line 178 (17-113) is tripped at t=30 sec 
 Line 39 (17-31) is tripped at t=40 sec 
 Region 3 is 
detected to form 
an island at t=30.2 
sec 
4 
Island 1: Region 1 
and Part of Region 
3 
Island 2: Rest of the 
System   
 Line 8 (5-8) is tripped at t=10 sec 
 Line 20 (12-16) is tripped at t=20 sec 
 Line 18 (13-15) is tripped at t=30 sec 
 Line 19 (14-15) is tripped at t=40 sec 
 Regions 1 and 3 
are detected to 
form an island at 
t=42.3 sec 
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For the sake of simplicity, only line outages are considered as contingencies to 
create islanding scenarios in Table 12. A delay of 10 sec is applied among contingencies 
to better understand the transient behavior of the system as well as the SIP method 
response. Next, simulation results of each cases from Table 12 is explained.  
Case 1: Figure 5.8 shows voltage magnitudes captured at PMU locations. The 
impact of outages can be seen on voltage profiles especially after the fourth contingencies. 
The voltage drop across regions 1, 2 and 3 is more severe due to overload condition in the 
island. The phasor angles captured at PMU locations are also shown in Figure 5.9. Both 
islands remain stable after the contingency, however, the generators in the island 1 
(regions 1, 2 and 3) go out of synchronism compare to generators in island 2 (main grid). 
The SIP module detects regions 1, 2 and 3 to form an island at t= 33.5 sec. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Voltage magnitude at PMU locations in case 1 
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Figure 5.9 Voltage angle at PMU locations in case 1 
 
 
 
Case 2: Figure 5.10 shows voltage magnitudes captured at PMU locations. The 
voltages oscillations after the second contingency indicates the impact of outages on both 
islands. As expected, bigger oscillations are related to the PMUs in island 1 (region 9).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Voltage magnitude at PMU locations in case 2 
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The phasor angles captured at PMU locations are shown in Figure 5.11. Both 
islands remain stable and the islanded machine angles go along with the main grid. The 
SIP module detects region 9 to form an island at t= 22.8 sec. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Voltage angle at PMU locations in case 2 
 
 
 
 
Case 3: Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 show the voltage magnitude and phasor angles 
captured at PMU locations, respectively. The voltage drop within the islanded regions can 
result in UVLS units operations. The machine angles remain synchronize with the main 
grid, but experiences large oscillations. The SIP module detects region 3 to form an island 
at t= 30.2 sec. 
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Figure 5.12 Voltage magnitude at PMU locations in case 3 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13 Voltage angle at PMU locations in case 3 
 
 
 
Case 4: Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 show the voltage magnitude and phasor angles 
captured at PMU locations, respectively. The severe impact of outages can be seen on 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
Time (sec)
V
m
 (
p
.u
.)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
Time (sec)
A
n
g
le
 (
D
eg
re
e)
93 
 
voltage profiles especially after the fourth contingency. The islanded area remains stable 
after the contingency and the islanded machine angles go along with the main grid. The 
SIP module detects regions 1 and 3 to form an island at t= 42.3 sec. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Voltage magnitude at PMU locations in case 4 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15 Voltage angle at PMU locations in case 4 
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 Conclusion 
In this section a two-step islanding prediction tool based on synchrophasor 
measurement has been proposed. The proposed SIP tool utilizes an efficient contingency 
creation algorithm to populate islanding scenarios. It then identifies unstable areas which 
are prone to creating un-wanted islands. Once such unstable areas are identified, the results 
may be used to trigger mitigation measures to prevent such isolations. This can prevent 
progression of cascading outages and possibly prevent a severe blackout. 
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6. INTEGRATED CONTROLLED ISLANDING TOOL*   
 Overview 
Once several disturbances take place in the electric grid, the power system stability 
margin shrinks which eventually may lead to formation of un-wanted islands. The 
intentional islanding (also known as controlled islanding) of the grid during this stage of 
cascading outage can reduce or even eliminate possibility of major blackouts.  
 Background on Controlled Islanding 
A number of severe blackouts have been reported in recent decades as the outcome 
of increasing electricity demand and power grid restructuring [112]. For example, on 
August 14th 2003, a devastating blackout hit the Northeastern US and Canada affecting 50 
million people with an estimated total damage of 4-10 billion dollars [3].  
In the slow progression stage of cascading outage, the overall performance of the 
system remains intact which can be resembled with steady state analysis. In this stage, 
utility operators may have enough time to evaluate the system condition, and take some 
control actions to prevent the possibility of further outages [113]. 
Various remedial and emergency actions including load and generator tripping, 
excitation controls and intentional islanding are deployed to prevent cascading blackouts 
[114]. Intentional islanding, also called controlled islanding, methods preserve stable areas 
                                                 
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “Prevention of power grid blackouts using intentional 
islanding scheme” by A. Esmaeilian and M. Kezunovic, Jan.-Feb. 2017. IEEE Transactions on Industry 
Applications, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 622-629, ©2017 IEEE, with permission from IEEE. 
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from further outages, and expedite the restoration process by reducing transient stability 
problems during system re-connection [115]-[124].   
The majority of controlled islanding schemes were classified as optimization 
problems. In [115]-[119], the slow coherency grouping of generators is utilized to split 
system into islands. In these studies, the coherent groups of generators are obtained by 
solving max-flow-min-cut optimization problem. However, due to highly nonlinear nature 
of the power system, the linearized electromechanical modeling, which is used in these 
methods may fail to obtain appropriate islanding solution.  
Another controlled islanding scheme is obtained considering a graph search based 
method called ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDD) [120], [121]. In this method, the 
original power system is substituted with a simplified equivalent obtained using a graph 
based reduction algorithm. The solution space is narrowed down using OBDDs to fulfill 
the equality constraints. Then, power flow result is used to decide whether any of the 
islanding solutions satisfy inequality constraints or not. The major drawbacks of this 
method are the additional calculation burden required for simplification process and the 
risk that the superior optimal solutions may be lost due to simplification.  
In recent years, several efforts were devoted to development of intentional 
islanding schemes based on clustering methods [122], [123]. In [122], a k-way spectral 
clustering method to split power systems into self-sustained islands considering minimum 
load-generation imbalance is presented. In [123], a multi-level kernel k-means algorithm 
to form islands based on minimum power flow disruption is proposed. The computational 
efficiency of these methods is good, but without dynamic constraints in the clustering 
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process, some of created islands may be divided into unstable sub-islands which 
eventually drive them to total blackouts.   
In [124], authors proposed a controlled islanding scheme based on particle swarm 
optimization. The method uses minimal power imbalance criteria to form islands. In this 
method connection among sub-graphs are neglected to reduce computational burden, 
while it may increase possibility of isolated buses within the created islands. 
 Spectral Clustering 
As previously shown in section 4, any electric grid can be represented using a 
graph where the vertices (nodes) and edges (links) of the graph stands for power system’s 
buses and lines, respectively. To represent characteristics of the mapped power grid, edges 
of the graph can be weighted using different parameters such as admittance, active or 
reactive power flow.  
In this dissertation, active power flow across transmission lines is used as the edge 
weight to determine cost of cutsets as will be presented later in this section. The edge 
weight matrix W is defined as: 
 
𝑊 = {𝑤𝑖𝑗 =
|𝑃𝑖𝑗| + |𝑃𝑗𝑖|
2
            𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 0                         𝑖 = 𝑗
 (6.1) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗 and 𝑃𝑗𝑖 are the active power injected into the line from buses 𝑖 and 𝑗, 
respectively. In (6.1), 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is calculated as the average power flow from two-end of the line 
to compensate power loss across the line. The edge weight matrix 𝑊 is calculated based 
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on power flow which can represent the dynamic nature of power system as it alters 
according to system operating states.  
The un-normalized Laplacian of the graph is defined as [125]: 
 
𝐿 = {
−𝑤𝑖𝑗          𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
𝑑𝑖 =∑𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
        𝑖 = 𝑗
  (6.2) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the element of edge weight matrix calculated in (6.1). The Laplacian matrix 
𝐿 can also be written as: 
 
𝐿 = 𝐷 −𝑊   (6.3) 
 
where 𝐷 is the degree matrix with diagonal nonzero entries 𝑑𝑖. The normalized Laplacian 
matrix 𝐿𝑁 is constructed using: 
 
𝐿𝑁 = 𝐷
−1
2⁄ . 𝐿. 𝐷
−1
2⁄      (6.4) 
 
The distinct features of the Laplacian matrix of the graph G are explained in the 
next subsection. As depicted in Figure 6.1, a graph-cut problem is referred to the splitting 
of graph G into 𝑆1 and 𝑆2 by cutting the connecting edges between 𝑆1 and 𝑆2. The set of 
edges and the sum of their weights are known as cutset and cut, respectively. 
 
𝑐𝑢𝑡(𝑆1, 𝑆2) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑖∈𝑆1,𝑗∈𝑆2
 (6.5) 
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Figure 6.1 Solving graph-cut problem using spectral clustering 
 
 
 
The graph-cut problem defined in (6.5) can be solved utilizing un-normalized 
spectral clustering method. It uses the two eigenvectors associated with the two smallest 
positive eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix of G to form 𝑆1 and 𝑆2. The un-normalized 
spectral clustering method is defined using below steps [68]: 
 Computing the two eigenvectors (𝑣1, 𝑣2) of the Laplacian matrix 𝐿 associated with 
the two smallest eigenvalues; 
 Defining 𝑉 as the matrix constructed using two columns of 𝑣1 and 𝑣2. 
 Defining 𝑦𝑖 as the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ row of 𝑉; 
 Applying a k-means or k-medoids clustering methods to cluster 𝑦𝑖 into 𝑆1and 𝑆2. 
Achieving a proper islanding solution using un-normalized spectral clustering of 
the power system graph might be infeasible as it splits power system into two islands 
without considering transient behavior of the system. Besides, it might also be necessary 
to divide the system into more than two islands to interrupt sequences of cascade outages.  
In this dissertation, a controlled islanding scheme utilizing constrained spectral 
clustering to address above concerns is introduced. The proposed method introduces k-
embedded clustering approach to allow splitting the system into several islands, if needed. 
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The proposed method considers generator coherency as an optimization constraint to 
avoid generators go out of synchronism and achieve stable islands.  
 Proposed Constraint Optimization Method    
Once successive disturbances took place in the electric grid, its stability margin 
degrades, which eventually may lead to system separation and formation of un-wanted 
islands. The intentional islanding of the grid during the preliminary state of cascading 
outages progression can decrease or eliminate the possibility of severe blackouts. The 
controlled islanding concept is primarily introduced to work at the transmission level. The 
control islanding scheme can also expedite the restoration process of the power system.  
To create an ideal self-sustained islanding solution, different constraints such as 
thermal limits, load-generation imbalance, generator coherency and transient stability 
should be taken into account [121]. Hence, a controlled islanding strategy is considered as 
a multi-constraint, multi-objective optimization problem in which it would rarely be 
possible to reach the best solution. So, a viable solution is to consider a sub-set of 
objectives and constraints to reduce the complexity of the problem. In this dissertation, 
the generator coherency is considered as a constraint to the minimization problem, while 
the power flow disruption between islands is defined as the objective function to be 
minimized.  
6.4.1 Static Constraints 
To attain a successful intentional islanding strategy, it is more influential to secure 
the transient stability rather than load-generation balance. An island with negative stability 
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index may ultimately become unstable even if the load-generation balance is satisfied 
within the island. There are two types of objective functions used in literature formulated 
as:  
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑆1,𝑆2⊂𝐺
(| ∑ (
|𝑃𝑖𝑗 + 𝑃𝑗𝑖|
2
)
𝑖∈𝑆1,𝑗∈𝑆2
|) (6.6) 
𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑆1,𝑆2⊂𝐺
(| ∑ (
|𝑃𝑖𝑗| + |𝑃𝑗𝑖|
2
)
𝑖∈𝑆1,𝑗∈𝑆2
|) (6.7) 
 
In (6.6), the objective function is defined to minimize the sum of active power 
flows between islands which is known as “power flow imbalance”. Solving the 
optimization problem with this objective function secures islands with good load-
generation balance. But, as shown in the example of Figure 6.2a, the solution may result 
in the switching of major transmission lines which transfer higher active power. 
Disconnection of such lines can cause transient stability problem at both intentional 
islanding and system restoration stages.  
In (6.7), the objective function is defined to minimize the absolute value of the 
active power flow between islands, known as “power flow disruption”. Solving the 
optimization problem with this objective function avoids the overloading of transmission 
lines within the islands. It can also facilitate reconnection of the islands in the restoration 
process due to the minimum power flow changes compared to the pre-disturbance 
condition (see Figure 6.2b). 
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In this dissertation, the objective function defined by (6.7) is selected to formulate 
the optimization problem.  
 
 
 
S2S1S2S1
(a) (b)
 
Figure 6.2 Two types of objective function using active power flow 
 
 
 
6.4.2 Dynamic Constraints 
A strong disturbance in an electric grid may trigger electromechanical wave 
oscillations which propagate through entire network and may result in generators going 
out-of-synchronism [91], [92]. The generators with stronger dynamic couplings remain 
synchronized with each other and are called coherent generators [126], [127]. Different 
approaches have been developed to determine coherent groups of generators [128], [129].  
To achieve reliable islanding strategy, each group of the coherent generators must 
be kept in the same islands.  
In this study, the generator coherency problem is determined using normalized 
spectral clustering. First, the dynamic graph of system 𝐿𝐷 is defined as:  
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𝐿𝐷 =
{
 
 
 
 |
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑖𝑗
⁄ |+|
𝜕𝑃𝑗𝑖
𝜕𝛿𝑗𝑖
⁄ |
2
           𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
−∑ 𝐿𝐷
𝑖𝑙𝑛
𝑙=1,𝑙≠𝑖            𝑖 = 𝑗
  (6.8) 
 
By applying the four steps of spectral clustering method introduced in section 6.3, 
the generators are divided into two coherent groups 𝑆𝐺1 and 𝑆𝐺2. Then, each group can be 
treated as a separate graph to perform recursive bisection spectral clustering till the desired 
number of coherent groups is achieved.  
Once coherent generators are determined, it can be used as a constraint to k-
embedded clustering method. Next, the constrained spectral k-embedded clustering 
method to achieve self-sustained islands will be discussed and formulated.  
6.4.3 Constrained Spectral K-Embedded Clustering 
Constrained spectral clustering is defined as a semi-supervised clustering method 
with the additional information converted in the form of pairwise constraints. This section 
describes how the generator coherency information is incorporated into constrained 
spectral clustering. The new constrained optimization formulation to solve controlled 
islanding problem is proposed. 
In the constrained spectral clustering the terms Must Link (ML) and Cannot Link 
(CL) refer to vertices which must remain and be removed in the final solution, respectively 
[130], [131]. A ML-constraint ensures that the vertices which are connected through the 
ML remain within the same cluster. A CL-constraint ensures the vertices which are 
connected through the CL are grouped in different clusters. The constraint matrix Q is 
defined in (6.9): 
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𝑄 = {
−1             𝑖𝑓 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) ∈ 𝐶𝐿
1            𝑖𝑓 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) ∈ 𝑀𝐿
0      𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
  
(6.9) 
 
The standard constrained clustering can only holds binary constraints for ML and 
CL. The following index is defined to verify satisfaction of constraints matrix Q. 
 
𝑢𝑇.𝑄.𝑢 = ∑ 𝑢𝑖.𝑖,𝑗 𝑢𝑗. 𝑞𝑖𝑗  (6.10) 
 
where  𝑢 ∈ {−1,1}𝑁 is the indicator vector. The further extension is achieved when 𝑢 and 
𝑄 are relaxed.  
 
𝑢 ∈ 𝑅𝑁  ,   𝑄 ∈ 𝑅𝑁×𝑁  (6.11) 
 
If 𝑄𝑖𝑗 > 0, then  𝑖 and 𝑗 are in the same cluster ; if 𝑄𝑖𝑗 < 0, then 𝑖 and 𝑗 are in 
different clusters. As the value of 𝑢𝑇.𝑄.𝑢 becomes higher the constraint matrix 𝑄 is more 
satisfied. The normalized form of constraint matrix 𝑄 is defined as follows. 
 
𝑄𝑁 = 𝐷
−1
2⁄ . 𝑄. 𝐷
−1
2⁄   (6.12) 
 
where 𝐷 is the degree matrix. The controlled islanding problem is defined as a constrained 
optimization problem with the following definition [131]: 
 
𝑎𝑟𝑔   𝑚𝑖𝑛     𝑣𝑇 . 𝐿𝑁 . 𝑣                                                          
𝑠. 𝑡.          𝑣𝑇 . 𝑄. 𝑣 > 𝛽 ,      𝑣𝑇 . 𝑣 = vol  ,   𝑣 ≠ 𝐷
1
2⁄ . 1
 (6.13) 
 
 
where  𝑣𝑜𝑙 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑖
𝑁
1  is the graph volume and 𝛽 is the satisfaction threshold. 𝑣
𝑇 . 𝐿𝑁 . 𝑣 is 
the cost of the cut, 𝑣𝑇 . 𝑣 is defined to normalize 𝑣 and 𝑣 ≠ 𝐷
1
2⁄ . 1 is defined to avoid 
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trivial solutions. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Theorem [132] is used to solve the objective 
function in (6.13). After several mathematical steps [131], the solution of optimization 
equation in (6.13) can be attained by solving the generalized eigenvalue equation in (6.14).   
 
𝐿𝑁𝑣 = 𝜆 (𝑄𝑁 −
𝛽
𝑣𝑜𝑙
𝐼) 𝑣 (6.14) 
 
In summary, as shown in Figure 6.3, the step by step constrained spectral k-
Embedded clustering algorithm is defined as follows. 
 
 Determining k as the total number of clusters obtained from generator coherency 
grouping. 
 Using graph representation of the power system to obtain edge weight matrix 𝑊 
and normalized Laplacian matrix 𝐿𝑁 using (6.1) and (6.4), respectively. 
 Building constraint matrix 𝑄 using (6.9). 
 Solving generalized eigenvalue problem in (6.14) 
 Disregarding eigenvectors related to non-positive eigenvalues.  
 Eigenvectors normalization using: 𝑣 ⟵ 
𝑣
‖𝑣‖
√𝑣𝑜𝑙. 
 Selecting k-1 eigenvectors (𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑘−1) related to the k-1 lowest eigenvalues. 
  Defining * argmin   T NV V L V 𝑉
∗ ⟵ 𝑉𝑇 . 𝐿𝑁 . 𝑉  where 𝑉 ∈ 𝑅
𝑛×𝑘−1 is the matrix 
built by vectors 𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑘−1 as columns [133].  
 Applying k-medoids algorithm to obtain final islanding solution. 
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Figure 6.3 The proposed controlled islanding method 
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Comparing to bisection spectral clustering [134], the proposed k-embedded 
spectral clustering has higher flexibility in adjusting clusters and partitioning process. 
Despite k-means method which uses squared distances among data-points, the k-medoids 
method eliminates data anomalies and noises as it minimizes the sum of variances. 
For instance, the proposed controlled islanding method is demonstrated using the 
simple IEEE 9-bus system with detail explanation of matrices formation. The generator 
coherency analysis results in separation of generators in two groups {G1} and {G2, G3} 
which can be seen in Figure 6.4. In this figure, the number attached to each line represents 
the per unit average active power flow across it. Figure 6.4 can be seen as a graph G where 
the lines and buses are edges and vertices, respectively. The weight of each edge is labeled 
next to it. Therefore, one can build the Laplacian matrix using (6.15). 
 
 
 
 
G1
G2 G3
1
4
5 6
2 37 8 9
0.75
0.82
1.63
0.22 0.85
0.58
0.280.37
0.72
Island 2
Island 1
 
Figure 6.4 Verifying ICI tool using IEEE 9-bus  
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0.72 0 0 0.72 0 0 0 0 0
0 1.63 0 0 0 0 1.63 0 0
0 0 0.85 0 0 0 0 0 0.85
0.72 0 0 1.37 0.37 0.28 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.37 1.19 0 0.82 0 0
0 0 0 0.28 0 0.86 0 0 0.58
0 1.63 0 0 0.82 0 3.2 0.75 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.97 0.22
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L









  
(6.15) 
 
The ML constraint between G2 and G3 are replaced by +1, and the CL constraint 
between G1 and {G2 and G3} are replaced by -1 to build matrix Q: 
 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q
    
(6.16) 
 
By calculating steps 4 to 9 in Figure 6.3, a single cutset is obtained as shown with 
dashed line in Figure 6.4. The cost of cut is the sum of average power flow across lines 
(4-5 and 4-6) and is equal to (0.28+0.37) = 0.65 p.u. The two islands include buses {1, 4} 
and {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, respectively. Since {G1} is in the island1 and {G2, G3} are in the 
island2, the suggested islanding scheme guarantees generator coherency constraints, too.  
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 Triggering Mechanism 
The key to mitigate cascading outages is to trigger the intentional islanding method 
at the proper time. Prior studies on prevention of blackouts using controlled islanding 
[115]-[124] failed to introduce a triggering mechanism for their proposed methods.  
In this dissertation, the SOVI, SOFI and SIP tools, defined in the previous sections, 
are combined to define a triggering mechanism for the intentional islanding module (see 
Figure 6.5). The triggering mechanism is defined based on thresholds for SOVI module 
along with disturbance data obtained from SOFI module and the output of SIP tool. The 
real time monitoring of a power system using the mentioned three modules allows the 
intentional islanding scheme to be deployed at the crucial time to interrupt the sequence 
of cascading outages.  The proposed ICI method is defined using the following steps 
[135]-[137]: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 The proposed tools triggering mechanisms  
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 The graph G is defined to resemble the entire power system. In this modelling, 
buses, lines and average power flow across each line represent the graph’s vertices, 
edges and edge weights, respectively. 
 The graph GD is defined to resemble the power system in dynamic time-scale. To 
obtain GD, the Kron reduction method [138] is used to remove the buses without 
generators. 
  Laplacian matrices L and LD corresponding to the graphs G and GD are calculated. 
 The spectral clustering optimization problem is defined to determine the coherent 
groups of generators. 
 The generator coherency result is used to define ML- and CL- constraints. A ML-
constraint ensures that the vertices which are connected through the ML remain 
within the same cluster. A CL-constraint ensures the vertices which are connected 
through the CL are grouped in different clusters. The constraint matrix Q is defined 
based on ML- and CL- constraints. 
 The constrained spectral clustering optimization method is used to find the 
islanding solution which results in islands with minimum power flow disruption 
across their boundaries while satisfies the constraint matrix Q. 
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 Case Study 
6.6.1 Cascade Outage Scenario Creation 
From Figure 6.6, one can observe that IEEE118 bus test system consists of several 
areas which are loosely connected to each other. It is expected that following several 
consecutive outages, those areas might be disconnected from each other. In such cases, 
unless the generation capacity of each area matches amount of loads in that area, one or 
more areas may experience brownout or blackout.  
Next, the sequence of events to create a hypothetical cascading event outage 
scenario is described, which will result in blackout. It should be noted that under-voltage 
load shedding is not considered in the scenario creation process to assist creating a system 
blackout, and 10 sec intervals are deliberately inserted between outages to help 
understanding of transient behavior after each step and assure readability of plots.  
 
1. Parallel lines between buses (42–49) are tripped at t=10 sec due to inter-circuit fault. 
2. Line between buses (37-38) is tripped at t=20 sec due to a phase to ground fault. 
3. Line between buses (25-27) is tripped at t=30 sec due to another phase to ground fault. 
4. Line between buses (17-30) is tripped at t=40 sec due to malfunction of distance relay 
caused by power swing.  
5. Line between buses (4-5) is overloaded and a single phase fault occurs due to sagging 
of the line. The corresponding relays trip the line at t=50 sec. 
6. Line between buses (5-11) is de-energized due to mis-operation of third zone relay 
under overload condition at t=60 sec. 
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7. Line between buses (5-6) is de-energized due to mis-operation of third zone relay 
under overload condition at t=70 sec. 
8. Line between buses (23-25) is de-energized due to mis-operation of third zone relay 
under overload condition at t=80 sec. Following outage of the line (23-25) the voltage 
profile of the system collapses and blackout occurs. 
Figure 6.7 shows the bus voltage, bus phase angle and frequency of the system in 
this cascade outage scenario. The first three events are considered as unstoppable outages 
(maintenance, faults, etc.) which may occur anytime in the system.  
After the fourth event, voltage of buses (33 to 37 and 39 to 42) dropped below 0.8 
pu, as the line (17-30) was the major route of transferring power from generators (10, 25 
and 26) to that load area. Following this outage, redistribution of power flow caused 
overloads on lines (4-5, 5-6 and 5-11) which resulted in events 5 to 7. 
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Figure 6.6 Testing ICI tool with IEEE 118-bus test system 
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(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 6.7 Bus voltage, bus angle and frequency of system during cascade outages-
without controlled islanding scheme 
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6.6.2 Controlled Islanding Scheme 
After several outages occurred, the controlled islanding scheme is triggered to 
determine the switching actions resulting in a self-sustained islanding solution. In this 
example, the islanding scheme is triggered after the third outage (line 25-27) occurred. 
The generator coherency spectral clustering method determines that generators at 
buses (10, 12, 25, 26 and 31) form the first coherent group while other generators form 
the second group. The constraint matrix Q is built using the generator coherency 
information. The constrained spectral clustering algorithm suggests switching of lines (15-
33, 19-34, 23-24 and 30-38) which divides the system into two islands as depicted in 
Figure 6.6.  
Figure 6.8 shows the bus voltage, bus phase angle and frequency of IEEE 118-bus 
system under cascade outage scenario and following switching lines (15-33, 19-34, 23-24 
and 30-38) at t=40 sec. The islanding solution prevents transferring power from island 2 
to island 1 through line (38-30), and from island 1 to island 2 through lines (15-33 and 19-
34) which avoids overloading of lines (4-5, 5-6, 5-11, 17-30 and 23-25). Comparing 
Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8, it is obvious that the proposed islanding solution prevents 
cascade outages and conserves the system from blackout. In Figure 6.8, the voltage profile 
of buses 40, 41 and 42 are below 0.8 pu following separation of the system. Further studies 
prove that shedding load at bus 42 can increase the voltage profile of these buses above 
0.8 pu threshold.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 6.8 Bus voltage, bus angle and frequency of system equipped with controlled 
islanding scheme 
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 The relatively small size of IEEE 118 bus system limited the scheme to a handful 
of scenarios. The additional test results using a real size system have been elaborated in 
section 7. Table 13 is a summary of results of deploying the proposed scheme for all 
created scenarios. The amount of load shedding (to maintain voltage profile above 0.8 pu) 
is much lower than when the controlled islanding scheme is deployed, which verifies the 
effectiveness of the scheme in preventing blackouts. 
 
 
 
TABLE 13 SUMMARY OF SIMULATED CASCADE OUTAGE SCENARIOS 
 Scenario_1 Scenario_2 Scenario_3 Scenario_4 
Number of 
islands 
2 2 3 3 
Switched  
lines 
15-33, 19-34  
23-24, 30-38  
68-81, 69-77 
75-77, 76-77 
15-33, 17-31, 19-20 
19-34, 23-24  
26-30, 30-38 
15-33, 19-34, 23-24 
30-38, 68-81, 69-77 
75-118, 76-77 
Load shedding 
w/o scheme 
4242 MW 4242 MW 4242 MW 4242 MW 
Load shedding 
w scheme 
96 MW 0 MW 71 MW 33 MW 
 
 
 
 
6.6.3 Computational Efficiency 
A successful intentional islanding scheme must be computationally efficient to be 
applicable to a real size system. Utilizing minimal power imbalance results in Non-
deterministic Polynomial-time hard (NP-hard) problems. The computational solution time 
of NP-hard problems grows in an exponential order [139]. In the proposed method, 
minimal power flow disruption is used as objective function, which can be solved in 
polynomial time order [139], [140]. The required run time of the presented scheme using 
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MATLAB R2016b for the two test systems are shown in Table 14. Simulations are 
executed using Windows 7, Intel(R) Xeon(R) 3.2GHz CPU, 12GB RAM PC.  
 
 
 
TABLE 14 PROPOSED METHOD EXECUTION TIME 
Test Systems IEEE 9-bus system IEEE 118-bus system 
Execution Time (s) <0.001 0.073 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 
In this section, a constrained spectral k-embedded clustering method [136], [137] 
to obtain a viable solution for intentional (controlled) islanding problem is proposed. The 
proposed tool can reduce time and complexity of islanding re-connection process, create 
stable islands using generator coherency data and minimize the amount of load shedding 
by minimizing power flow disruption across islands’ boundaries. The tool has been tested 
using few cascading outage scenarios and its fast and accurate performance has been 
verified. The tool, if utilized by the operators controlling the power system, could be a last 
resort to rescue power system from state of blackouts.  
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7. TESTING METHODOLOGY USING LARGE NETWORK 
 Test System 
In this section a cascading outage scenario is studied on the 1354-buses European 
transmission system [141], [142] as shown in Figure 7.1. This system accurately 
represents part of the European high voltage transmission network. The network contains 
1354-buses, 260 generators, and 1,991 branches and it operates at 380 and 220 kV.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 1354-bus European high voltage transmission network 
Area 1
Area 2
Area 3
Area 4
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The data stems from the Pan European Grid Advanced Simulation and State 
Estimation (PEGASE) project, part of the 7th Framework Program of the European Union 
[143]. In this study, 40 PMUs are placed in the system as shown in Figure 7.1. 
 Full Scale Synchrophasor Testbed 
Figure 7.2 shows the TAMU synchrophasor testbed environment used to perform 
the testing. The power system is modeled in RT-LAB and events are simulated in OPAL-
RT simulator. PMU measurements from 40 locations as shown in Figure 7.1 are 
transferred through substation PDCs and communication channels to the control center 
PDC. The measurements are archived in PI historian server. GE software solution is used 
to visualize the measurements. A cascading outage scenario has been studied next. 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.2 TAMU synchrophasor testbed 
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 Test Results Before Utilization of the Proposed Tools 
Figures 7.3 to 7.6 show the voltage profile captured by PMU units in four areas of 
the system defined in Figure 7.1. The cascading events started with several independent 
outages that has occurred between t=20 sec to t=40 sec. As a result, the security margin of 
the system has decreased. Several lines overloaded in the boundaries of area 1 and 2 due 
to load-generation imbalance and change of power flow paths. In the time span of t=40 
sec to t=140 sec, several overloaded lines were tripped one after each other making the in-
service ones more overloaded until areas 1 and 2 are islanded from the rest of the system. 
In area 1, load-generation balance along with reactive generation reserve prevents voltage 
collapse, however power swings and small oscillations continues up to 50 sec after 
separation of area 1 from the main island (see Figure 7.3).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Voltage profile of area 1 without proposed tools   
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Due to excessive loads in area 2, once they are separated from the system, 
generators in area 2 become over-excited until the over-excitation protective units operate 
and disconnect several generators. As shown in Figure 7.4, area 2 collapses at around 
t=160 sec.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Voltage profile of area 2 without proposed tools   
 
 
 
 
Area 3 and 4 remains connected to each other, but experience a non-decaying 
swing after separation from area 1 and 2 which can be seen in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.5 Voltage profile of area 3 without proposed tools  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Voltage profile of area 4 without proposed tools   
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 Test Results After Utilization of the Proposed Tools 
Figure 7.7 to Figure 7.10 show the voltage profile captured by PMU units in the 
four areas under the same scenario with deployment of proposed tools. The proposed 
monitoring tools triggers the ICI tool at t=85 sec. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Voltage profile of area 1 with proposed tools   
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Figure 7.8 Voltage profile of area 2 with proposed tools   
 
 
 
Once ICI tool is triggered, several lines are selected to be switched out to create 
intentional islands. The intentional island includes area 2 and lower part of area 1 in 
Figure 7.1. Deployment of proposed tools resulted in prevention of cascading outages and 
area 2 black out. It can be seen from Figure 7.8 that the system oscillations die down after 
t=160 sec. 
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Figure 7.9 Voltage profile of area 3 with proposed tools  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10 Voltage profile of area 4 with proposed tools  
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 Conclusion 
In this section, a real size system has been modeled using the full scale 
synchrophasor testbed. A realistic cascade outage scenario has been simulated and the 
system condition has been investigated before and after utilization of the proposed tools. 
The test results further proved the accuracy and effectiveness of the proposed tools.  
The integrated scheme, if utilized in a real power system, could provide powerful 
means to help operators monitor and arrest cascade outages at early stages and rescue 
power system from severe blackouts.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The power system cascading outages are complex. Studies have revealed the 
devastating impacts of cascading outages on economic and social life. Many researchers 
tried to find a feasible way to detect, prevent and mitigate them. Synchrophasor systems 
can provide a unique opportunity to detect, prevent and mitigate cascading outages.  
In this dissertation several major blackouts in recent decades have been explored to 
understand mechanisms of cascading outages, their causes and consequences. A set of 
tools for fast detection and mitigation of cascading outages in power system based on 
availability of synchrophasor system has been developed and presented.  
  Contributions  
The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows: 
 Formulation of the mechanism of cascading outages. This dissertation explored 
several major cascading blackouts in the world. By investigating the mechanism 
of cascading outages, it can be concluded that most cascading outages have a few 
typical stages: normal and alert stages, emergency stage (slow progression of 
cascade outages) and in extremis stage (fast progression of cascade outages). The 
normal, alert and emergency stages operators may have enough time to evaluate 
the system condition, identify some vulnerable contingencies, take some control 
to increase the security level and prevent the possible cascading blackouts. The in 
extremis stage requires tools for automated actions since the transient stability 
collapse needs to be prevented extremely quickly.  
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 Development of the online synchrophasor based vulnerability analysis and fault 
identification methods. The proposed Synchrophasor based Online Vulnerability 
Index (SOVI) tool is aimed at providing a comprehensive evaluation for individual 
components as well as system-wide security situation under different conditions. 
The importance of each bus and transmission line is taken into account by 
calculating the vertex and edge betweenness centrality. The Synchrophasor based 
Online Fault Identification (SOFI) tool is aimed at providing real time information 
regarding contingencies in the system, which can be used by operator and 
maintenance crews to expedite the restoration process. These tools can operate 
together to alarm operator at the early stage of cascading outage. 
 Development of the synchrophasor based islanding prediction method to identify 
areas prone to formation of un-wanted islands. The proposed Synchrophasor 
based Islanding Prediction (SIP) tool consists of an offline part of islanding 
database creation and ANN training, and an online part where the SIP tool uses the 
SOVI’s outputs and the trained ANN module to predict possibility of islanding 
cases. A depth of observability method is used to create a reasonable and realistic 
islanding scenario database. A neural network is trained using MATLAB toolbox 
to recognize areas prone to be separated from the system. 
 Development of the controlled islanding mitigation tool as the last resort to 
prevent the system blackouts. The proposed Integrated Controlled Islanding (ICI) 
tool reduced the complexity and time of re-connection process due to the nature of 
objective function used in formulations. Definition of objective function based on 
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minimal power flow disruption also resulted in more stabilized islands. The slow 
coherency information used as the constraint in optimization process ensure that 
non-coherent generators are not in the same islands. The spectral k-embedded 
clustering provides flexibility in the clustering process. Unlike prior studies, this 
dissertation defined an integrated real time triggering mechanism obtained from 
several proposed synchrophasor based monitoring modules (SOVI, SOFI and SIP) 
to enable the ICI mitigation tool at the proper time. 
 Advantages of the Proposed Methods 
Compared to prior work, the main advantages of this study are: 
 The integrated scheme detects disturbances, and provides immediate topology 
update. So the error caused by divergence of conventional state estimator under 
some contingency scenarios could be avoided (Alert/Emergency Stages); 
 The integrated scheme monitors the system at local and system-wide levels and 
identifies system vulnerability as indices to be used to automate triggering of SIP 
and ICI modules at the proper time (Alert/Emergency Stages); 
 The integrated scheme identifies unstable areas which are prone to create un-
wanted islands, and automatically triggers RAS to prevent such isolations 
(Emergency Stage);  
 The integrated scheme prevents the propagation of cascading outages by 
intentional separation of the system to minimize the amount of load shedding and 
to increase transient stability of the created islands (Extreme Stage); 
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 Due to minimization of power flow across boundaries of intentionally created 
islands, the integrated scheme allows faster and less complex restoration process 
(Restoration Stage). 
 Suggestion for Future Research 
The research described in this dissertation may be continued in the future in the 
following directions: 
 A (hybrid) PMU based state estimation method can be developed to work along 
with the tools to provide an accurate topology model of the system in real time. 
With an online state estimation, all states of the system could be available with 
high accuracy which allows the SOVI tool to be implemented for all buses, lines 
and generators rather than only the ones equipped with PMUs. 
 Other intelligent methods such as the decision tree method can be used instead of 
the proposed ANN method to explore possibility of performance improvement for 
the SIP tool. The decision tree analysis has been widely used for different power 
system applications. 
 In this study, depth of observability is used as the constraint to reduce the size of 
islanding database. Other graph search methods can be explored in order to reduce 
the computation burden and speed up the offline process.   
 All the proposed methods are programmed in MATLAB. They need to be 
converted to highly efficient programming code using different programming 
language if the field test is to be applied in the future. 
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